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I.  Introduction
On July 1, 2003, Georgia’s first increase in excise taxes on tobacco products
since 1971 became effective.1  These higher taxes were approved in the waning moments
of the 2003 Georgia legislative session and reflected considerable modifications in the
tax proposals originally submitted by Governor Sonny Perdue.2  The following specific
changes were enacted:
! The state excise tax on cigarettes was increased from 12 cents to 37 cents
per pack;
! The state ad valorem tax on cigars was increased from 10 percent to 23
percent;
! Smokeless tobacco products were taxed for the first time at the ad valorem
rate of 10 percent. 
Much of the political debate focused on issues beyond the specifics of tobacco
taxation, such as the propriety of the first Republican governor since Reconstruction
proposing tax increases (of whatever type), and the related issue of the proper size of
government and the extent to which waste and inefficiency characterizes Georgia
government.3  A notable exception was the concerted lobbying by the Georgia
Association of Convenience Stores, which  provided additional reasons for already
reluctant legislators to oppose this specific tax due to concerns with possible severe job
and business losses in border areas such as Columbus and Augusta.4  But, the overall
state financing crisis of a $620-$650 million revenue shortfall served as a dramatic
backdrop to any budgetary deliberations and generally forced the debate to broader
issues.  
In the face of such controversies, a detailed analysis of the specific issues in the
economics of tobacco (particularly cigarette) taxation generated little legislative or
public interest.5  Thus, almost by default, the arguments being made by the anti-smoking
lobbyists were at least implicitly accepted.  These arguments were:
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1. Increases in tobacco taxes would significantly increase state revenues.6
2. There would be noteworthy health benefits as a consequence of
reductions in smoking (particularly by young people) following the
resulting increases in tobacco prices.
3. Any lost revenues (on tobacco products themselves, general sales tax
revenues, or Georgia lottery funds) from the loss of convenience store
sales (especially near state borders) as a result of either cross-border
shopping, organized cigarette smuggling, or internet shopping would
be relatively minor. 
4. The threat of  job losses and reduced economic activity in the state’s
tobacco growing and cigarette manufacturing and distribution (e.g.,
convenience store) sectors would be relatively minor since Georgia
tobacco consumers play a small role in the national and worldwide
market for tobacco products, and convenience store losses would be
short term and limited geographically. 
5. An increase in tobacco taxes would correct for various costs (estimated
to be $6.38 per pack for Georgia7) imposed on society by excessive
smoking and other tobacco abuse.  This argument was made even
though the tobacco “master settlement agreement” had already led to
higher cigarette prices and large additional payments by smokers.8
Despite the temporary lull in this debate as the governor and the legislature
contemplate their further options in a still fiscally fragile state, it is appropriate to revisit
these five presumptions about the Georgia tobacco tax increases to determine the degree
to which they are supported by conceptual analysis and empirical evidence.  Even if each
of the five presumptions were valid last year, some of them may be vulnerable in the face
of further tax hikes.
This report addresses the current state of academic and policy research
regarding tobacco (particularly cigarette) taxation, with an emphasis on the lessons
for future Georgia policy-making.9  The report proceeds as follows.  In the next section
we discuss cigarette taxation in the U.S. and tobacco consumption patterns.  In the face
of that background, we then address the following issues:
! The effect of higher cigarette tax rates on state tax revenues, both from the
adopted 25 cents tax increase and a further increase of 21 cents, which
would result in a total cigarette tax increase equal to the originally
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proposed increase of 46 cents.  We consider potential future cigarette tax
proposals in Georgia because of Georgia’s continuing budget problems
and the fact that six states recently raised such taxes more than once within
a recent two-year period.10 
! We adjust the revenue estimates to account for various forms of tax
avoidance and evasion (cross-border shopping, internet sales, and
smuggling).  We also consider the degree to which revenue from the sales
tax or the Georgia lottery may decline.
! The magnitude of the effect on smoking rates and the resulting potential
health benefits is discussed.
! The regressivity of the tax, as well as other incidence questions, are then
addressed.
! The magnitude of adverse effects, if any, on the Georgia economy linked
to the tobacco industry is assessed, based on the claims made by the tax
opponents.
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II.   Cigarette Taxation, Prices, and Consumption
A.  Cigarette Taxation in the United States
The current federal cigarette excise tax rate is 39 cents per pack (effective
January 1, 2002).  State taxes on cigarettes currently range from 2.5 cents to 205 cents
per pack (see Table 1).  With almost all states facing pressing budgetary crises, raising
cigarette taxes became a popular fiscal option.  As many as 29 states (plus the District
of Columbia) increased their tax rates in 2002-2003 alone, with average state cigarette
tax rates increasing from 31 cents per pack in 1990 (in 2002 dollars) to 62 cents by the
end of 2002 and 70.4 cents as of early July 2003.   Six states increased tax rates more
than once since 2000 (Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, and
Vermont), with four increasing cigarette taxes in both 2002 and 2003 (Connecticut by
61 and 40 cents; Kansas by 46 and 9 cents; New Jersey by 70 and 55 cents; and Vermont
by 49 cents and 26 cents). Table 1 provides an update of the state cigarette tax picture
as of July 1, 2003.
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TABLE 1.  STATE CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES AND RANKINGS: JULY 1, 2003
State
Tax 
(Cents 
per pack) Rank Effective Date / Prior Increase / Other Notes
Alabama 16.5 47 7/1/84; 1-6 cent option for cities/counties
Alaska 100 12 10/1/97 (from 29)
Arizona 118 11 11/25/02 (from 60); prior 11/94
Arkansas 59 26 6/1/03 (from 34); prior 7/01 (from 30); + dealers
pay $1.25/1000 administrative fee 
California 87 19 1/1/99 (from 37)
Colorado 20 43 7/1/86
Connecticut 151 2 3/15/03 (from 111); prior 4/02 (from 50)
Delaware 24 41 1/1/91; increases by 31 cents on 8/1/03
District of
Columbia
100 12 1/1/03 (from 65); prior 7/93
Florida 33.9 40 7/1/90 
Georgia* 37 36 7/1/03 (from 12)
Hawaii 120 9 10/1/02 (from 100); prior 7/98 (from 80); + 10
cents 7/1/04
Idaho 57 27 6/1/03 (from 28); reverts to 28 cents 7/1/05
Illinois 98 17 7/1/02 (from 58); prior 12/97 (from 44); 10 - 15
cent option for cities/counties
Indiana 55.5 28 7/1/02 (from 15.5); prior 7/1/87
Iowa 36 37 6/1/91
Kansas 79 20 7/1/03 (from 70); prior 6/02 (from 24)
Kentucky* 3 50 7/1/70; + dealers pay .1 cents/pack administrative
fee
Louisiana 36 37 8/1/02 (from 24); prior 8/00 (from 20)
Maine 100 12 10/1/01 (from 74); prior 11/97 (from 37)
Maryland 100 12 7/1/02 (from 66); prior 7/99 (from 36)
Table 1 continues next page...
The Economics of Cigarette Taxation:
Lessons for Georgia
6
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).  STATE CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES AND RANKINGS:
JULY 1, 2003
State
Tax 
(Cents 
per pack) Rank Effective Date / Prior Increase / Other Notes
Massachusetts 151 2 7/25/02 (from 76); prior 10/96 (from 51)
Michigan 125 8 8/1/02 (from 75); prior 5/94 (from 25)
Minnesota 48 33 7/1/92
Mississippi 18 45 6/1/85
Missouri 17 46 10/1/93; 4 - 7 cent option for cities/counties
Montana 70 22 5/1/03 (from 18); prior 8/93
Nebraska 64 24 10/1/02 (from 34); - 30 cents on 10/1/04
Nevada 35 39 7/1/89 (from 20)
New Hampshire 52 32 7/1/99 (from 37)
New Jersey 205 1 7/1/03 (from 150); prior 7/02 (from 80); 1/98
(from 40)
New Mexico 91 18 7/1/03 (from 21)
New York 150 4 4/3/02 (from 111); prior 3/00 (from 56); 150 also
NYC 
North Carolina* 5 49 8/1/91
North Dakota 44 34 7/1/93
Ohio 55 29 7/1/02 (from 24)
Oklahoma 23 42 6/1/87
Oregon 128 7 11/1/02 (from 68); prior 2/97 (from 38) 
Pennsylvania 100 12 7/15/02 (from 31)
Rhode Island 132 6 5/1/02 (from 100); prior 7/01 (from 71); 7/97
(from 61); + 10 cents on 7/1 for 5 yrs.
South Carolina* 7 48 7/1/77
South Dakota 53 31 3/18/03 (from 33); prior 7/1/95 (from 23)
Table 1 continues next page...
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).  STATE CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES AND RANKINGS:
JULY 1, 2003
State
Tax 
(Cents 
per pack) Rank Effective Date / Prior Increase / Other Notes
Tennessee* 20 43 7/1/02 (from 13);1 cent option cities/counties; +
dealers pay .05 cent administrative fee
Texas 41 35 7/1/90
Utah 69.5 23 5/6/02 (from 51.5); prior 7/97 (from 26.5)
Vermont 119 10 7/1/03 (from 93); prior 7/02 (from 44); 9/95
(from 20)
Virginia* 2.5 51 9/1/60; + municipal option as high as 60 cents
(50 cities) 
Washington 142.4 5 1/1/02 (from 82.4)
West Virginia 55 29 5/1/03 (from 17); prior 8/78
Wisconsin 77 21 10/1/01 (from 59); prior 11/97 (from 44)
Wyoming 60 25 7/1/03 (from 12); prior 7/89
Puerto Rico 123 NA
Overall State
Average
70.4 
Overall State
Median
59.0
Tobacco State
Average
12.4
Non-Tobacco
State Average
78.1
Notes: *designates one of the six tobacco producing states; state averages omit Puerto Rico; rate
does not include state and local sales taxes where applicable (all states with a sales tax apply that
tax to the portion of the retail price including the cigarette tax except Alabama, Missouri and
Georgia).  
Sources: Federation of Tax Administrators (2003); Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (2003a);
Orzechowski and Walker (2001), ( previous volumes were funded by the tobacco industry through
the Tobacco Institute, which was dissolved as part of the Master Settlement Agreement). 
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B.  Cigarette Prices and Consumption, Smoking Rates, and Ranking
Smoking rates, the number of smokers, and cigarette pack sales for each state is
provided in Table 2.  Georgia ranks 29th among states and the District of Columbia in
its adult smoking rate (23.7 percent), with Utah having the lowest rate (13.3 percent) and
Kentucky the highest (30.9 percent).  The national average is 22.8 percent.  The youth
smoking rate for Georgia youth is 23.7 percent, which ranks as the 9th lowest, and
compares favorably with the national average of 28.5 percent.   
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TABLE 2.  SMOKING STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES:2001-2003
State
Sales $
(millions)
FY 2002
Retail price
($ per pack 
incl. 2003
tax rates)
Adult
Smokers 
(thousands)
Adult
Rate
(percent)
Adult
Rank
1 = lowest
Youth
Rate
(percent)
Youth
Rank
1 = lowest
Alabama 378.5 3.15 794.4 23.9 30 23.7 9
Alaska 40.4 4.34 113.9 26.1 44 33.9 42
Arizona 276.1 4.44 809.2 21.5 12 19.0 3
Arkansas 234.8 3.70 510.2 25.6 40 34.7 44
California 1,234.9 4.11 4,235.0 17.2 2 21.6 6
Colorado 292.6 3.01 716.9 22.4 19 25.3 19
Connecticut 227.4 4.74 533.3 20.8 8 25.6 21
Delaware 113.4 2.98 147.8 25.1 38 24.2 14
D.C. 25.4 4.14 95.1 20.8 9 14.7 2
Florida 1,277.3 3.33 2775.6 22.5 22 19.0 3
Georgia 666.2 3.01 1,426.1 23.7 29 23.7 9
Hawaii 62.6 4.57 188.6 20.6 7 24.5 15
Idaho 83.6 3.38 182.2 19.7 3 19.1 5
Illinois 885.2 4.02 2,165.0 23.6 27 34.0 43
Indiana 742.1 3.52 1,239.2 27.5 47 31.6 36
Iowa 249.7 3.22 486.8 22.2 15 32.7 38
Kansas 208.8 3.75 438.5 2.22 16 26.1 23
Kentucky 572.5 2.89 941.5 30.9 51 40.0 48
Louisiana 433.3 3.21 805.8 24.8 37 33.3 40
Maine 102.4 4.12 233.7 24.0 32 24.8 17
Maryland 301.0 3.95 839.3 21.3 10 23.7 9
Massachusetts 354.0 4.82 955.3 19.7 4 26.0 22
Michigan 780.1 4.34 1,887.1 25.7 41 27.6 26
Minnesota 352.8 3.49 806.4 22.2 17 28.9 33
Mississippi 261.5 3.15 525.6 25.4 39 23.6 8
Missouri 558.3 2.94 1,079.4 25.9 42 30.3 35
Table 2 continues next page...
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED).  SMOKING STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES:2001-2003
State
Sales $
(millions)
FY 2002
Retail price
($ per pack
incl. 2003 
tax rates)
Adult
Smokers 
(thousands)
Adult
Rate
(percent)
Adult
Rank
1 = lowest
Youth
Rate
(percent)
Youth
Rank
1 = lowest
Montana 67.3 3.49 147.2 21.9 13 28.5 32
Nebraska 132.4 3.82 257.2 20.4 5 29.0 34
Nevada 173.1 3.26 401.3 27.0 46 25.2 18
N. Hampshire 166.7 3.33 223.2 24.1 34 25.3 19
New Jersey 495.2 4.64 1,347.6 21.3 11 24.5 15
New Mexico 95.4 3.98 313.2 23.9 31 36.2 47
New York 884.4 5.65 3,340.0 23.4 26 26.8 24
N. Carolina 806.6 3.02 1,576.1 25.9 43 27.8 28
N. Dakota 43.4 3.52 106.4 22.1 14 35.3 45
Ohio 1,101.0 3.51 2,344.8 27.7 48 33.4 41
Oklahoma 352.8 3.09 736.8 28.8 50 24.0 13
Oregon 231.3 3.80 527.8 20.5 6 22.0 7
Pennsylvania 1,067.4 3.95 2,221.4 24.6 36 27.6 26
Rhode Island 79.1 4.65 192.1 24.0 33 24.8 17
S. Carolina 396.2 3.00 786.6 26.2 45 36.0 46
S. Dakota 57.1 3.49 123.7 22.4 20 33.0 39
Tennessee 593.6 3.26 1,046.9 24.4 35 32.4 37
Texas 1,244.3 3.49 3,367.1 22.5 23 28.4 30
Utah 91.0 3.73 201.4 13.3 1 8.3 1
Vermont 57.0 4.11 103.3 22.4 21 23.7 9
Virginia 662.1 2.95 1,201.6 22.5 24 NA NA
Washington 269.5 4.82 989.9 22.6 25 28.0 29
West Virginia 199.5 3.37 396.5 28.2 49 39.2 49
Wisconsin 408.3 3.89 942.8 23.6 28 27.1 25
Wyoming 46.1 3.50 81.0 22.2 18 28.4 30
Table 2 continues next page...
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED).  SMOKING STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES:2001-2003
State
Sales $
(millions)
FY 2002
Retail price
($ per pack
incl. 2003 
tax rates)
Adult
Smokers 
(thousands)
Adult
Rate
(percent)
Adult
Rank
1 = lowest
Youth
Rate
(percent)
Youth
Rank
1 = lowest
State Average 400.0 3.72 941.2 22.8 - 28.5 -
Sources: The latest update from Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2003a) as derived from various sources.  Similar data are
reported by OTDirect (a cigarette selling organization linked to the Sovereign Seneca Indian Territory) at OTDirect.com.  Note that
there was no change in the reported Youth Smoking Rates between the latest update of these data and the previous one, suggesting
no updated data had been received.  The exception is Texas, which dramatically drops from the 28.4 percent reported in the table
to 24.7 percent.  Since this is the only state where a change is reported, and the magnitude of the change is suspicious, the higher
rate is reported in Table 2 consistent with the stable rates reported for all other states.
Note: According to the National Health Interview Survey (U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 2000), a “current smoker”
prior to 1992 was defined as a person who has smoked a least 100 cigarettes during their lifetime and who smokes every day.
Beginning in 1992 the definition was modified to also include people who smoke only “some days.”  This same standard is used
by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2003), and the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (1999).   
A more detailed picture of historical trends in smoking and the relationship with
education, race, income, and age is reported in Table 3.  These data are important for
determining just who will bear the primary burden of higher cigarette taxes (see the tax
incidence discussion below).
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TABLE 3.  U.S. SMOKING RATES IN PERCENT BY DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES:
SELECTED YEARS 1965-1998
1965 1974 1985 1990 1995 1997-98
Overall Rate 42.4 37.1 30.1 25.5 24.7 24.0
Age Age 12-17 - - 29.4 22.4 20.2 19.9
18-25 - - 47.4 40.9 35.3 40.6
26-34 - - 45.7 42.4 34.7 44.7
> 35 - - 35.5 28.9 27.2 27.9
Income <$15 K - - - 31.6 28.8 -
$15-24.99K - - - 29.8 27.2 -
$25-34.99K - - - 26.9 - -
$35-50.00K - - - 23.4 - -
> $50K - - - 19.3 17.2 -
Education < 12 yrs. - - - 31.8 - -
12 yrs. - - - 29.6 - -
> 12 yrs. - - - 18.3 - -
Race/Gender White Male 51.1 41.9 31.7 28.0 26.6 26.3
Black Male 60.4 54.3 39.9 32.5 28.5 29.0
White Female 34.0 31.7 27.7 23.4 23.1 22.6
Black Female 33.7 36.4 31.0 21.2 24.2 20.8
Race/Gender
for 18 to 24
year olds White Male 53.0 40.8 28.4 27.4 28.4 34.1
Black Male 62.8 54.9 27.2 21.3 14.6 19.7
White Female 38.4 34.0 31.8 25.4 24.9 28.0
Black Female 37.1 35.6 23.7 10.0 8.8 8.3
Source: Various tables from the Health and Nutrition section of the Statistical Abstract of the
United States for the years 2001, 1999, 1997 and 1996.  Income ranges are in 1995 dollars.
Smoking data for 1995 are from the Behavior Risk Factors Surveillance Surveys cited in Evans et
al. (1999).
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The data in Table 3 reveal five major points about smoking in the United States:
1. Overall smoking rates have declined significantly since 1965, although the
rate of decrease has understandably slowed and some age groups have
defied this trend in more recent periods, especially whites 18-25 years of
age.
2. Smoking rates vary inversely with income, ranging from a high of 31.6
percent for the lowest income class to 19.3 percent for those with the
highest incomes.
3. Smoking rates also decline uniformly with education level, from 31.8
percent for those without a high school education to 18.3 percent with
those going beyond high school.11
4. Black male smoking rates were especially high 40 years ago but have
declined even more significantly than those of white males.  Thus, by the
late 1990s the gap had narrowed from over 9 percentage points to less than
3 percentage points.
5. Racial differences in overall smoking rates differ much less for females,
with white rates sometimes below, but more recently slightly exceeding,
black rates.  Smoking rates among young blacks plummeted starting in the
mid 1980s relative both to young whites and to overall black rates,
especially among females.  By contrast, young whites, regardless of
gender, have much higher smoking rates than black youth.
Regarding smoking rates among Georgians, the trend over the period from 1984
to 2001 was a drop from 37 percent to 26 percent for men and from 25 percent to 22
percent for women  (Georgia Division of Public Health, 2002).  More detailed smoking
demographic data for Georgia as of 1999-2000 are described in Chart 1.
These recent statistics for Georgia confirm that smoking: (1) declines with
education and generally with age; (2) is more prevalent among whites and Hispanics
compared to blacks; (3) is higher among men than women; and (4) remains significant
among high school youths, despite the fact that the Georgia smoking rate of 24.3 percent
for youth in grades 9-12 is lower than the national rate of 28.0 percent (although slightly
higher in grades 6-8; 13.8 percent compared to the national rate of 11.0 percent.
The Economics of Cigarette Taxation:
Lessons for Georgia
14
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
<12 yrs
educ
12 yrs educ >12 yrs
educ
age 18-24 age 25-44 age 45-64 age 65+ Black Hispanic White Male Female
Chart 1.  Demographic Characteristics
Sm
ok
in
g 
R
at
e
The Economics of Cigarette Taxation:
Lessons for Georgia
15
The more detailed results from the Georgia Youth Tobacco Survey, Summary
Report (Georgia Department of Human Resources, 1999), which surveyed public school
students in grades 6-12, include:
1. Lifetime (ever smoked), current (use on one or more of the previous thirty
days) and frequent (use on 20 or more days of the 30 days proceeding the
survey) were 49 percent, 14 percent, and four percent, respectively, with
lifetime smoking rates of 59 percent for eighth graders versus 36 percent
in sixth grade.  Male lifetime rates were 51 percent versus 47 percent for
females, and Hispanic rates were higher at 63 percent than those for white
students (49 percent) and black students (46 percent).  
2. Lifetime rates for cigar smoking were lower than for cigarettes.  The
reported rate was 21 percent  among sixth graders, 30 percent for seventh
graders, and 39 percent for eighth graders.  The overall prevalence of
current cigar smoking was 8 percent, with males (11 percent)
unsurprisingly higher than females (5 percent).
3. The lowest usage rates were for smokeless tobacco products, with 12
percent reporting some lifetime use and four percent reporting current use.
The rate for Hispanics (21 percent) is significantly higher than whites (15
percent) and blacks (6 percent).  Males (7 percent) were more than three
times as likely as females (2 percent) to be current smokeless tobacco
users.  While smokeless tobacco use is lower than that of cigarettes, usage
in Georgia is high compared to other states, especially among white males.
C.  Background Summary
Until 2003, Georgia had not increased its cigarette excise tax in over thirty years.
Its 2002 tax rate of 12 cents per pack, when adjusted for inflation since 1971, was the
equivalent to 2.7 cents per pack, a real rate not seen since the early 1950s.  Had the tax
been adjusted solely for the overall change in the consumer price index since 1971, the
new tax rate would be 53.3 cents per pack, 44 percent higher than the 37 cent rate that
became effective on July 1, 2003, and about 9 percent lower than the 58 cent tax
originally proposed by the governor.12  Despite the recent increase, 35 states have
higher tax rates, although the increase did move Georgia from the second highest tax
rate among the six tobacco producing states to the highest; Tennessee is second with a
tax of 20 cents per pack.  On the other hand, Georgia (along with northern Florida) is a
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relatively minor tobacco producing region among the seven regions typically identified,
generating about 6 percent of total tobacco cash receipts.13  
Potentially more important to the issue of the loss of cigarette sales to non-
Georgia vendors is that Georgia’s tax rate of 37 cents per pack exceeds that of all of its
neighboring states, with Florida’s 33.9 cent rate being the next highest, followed by
Tennessee at 20 cents, Alabama at 16.5 cents, South Carolina at 7 cents, and North
Carolina at 5 cents (see Table 1).
From the perspective of smoking prevalence, 28 states have a lower adult
smoking rates than Georgia’s rate of 23.7 percent.  Georgia has a better record regarding
youth smoking (at 23.7 percent it is notably below the national average rate of 28.5
percent, and is relatively low among high school students).  An interesting, but yet
untested hypothesis is that Georgia’s lower youth smoking rate is possibly influenced by
its relatively large black population, among whom smoking rates in younger age groups
are remarkably low compared to the white population (19.7 percent versus 34.1 percent
for 18 to 24 year old males and 8.3 percent versus 28.0 percent for 18 to 24 year old
females).14
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III.  The Revenue Consequence of Higher Cigarette Tax Rates
A.  Background
Table 4 shows the most recent five-year history of cigar and cigarette tax
revenues in Georgia.  For the recently completed FY 2003, cigar and cigarette tax
revenue were estimated to be $82 million.  Revenues for FY 2003 were 10.9 percent
below those for FY 1999.15  Total revenue for calender year 2000 (CY 2000), averaging
FY 2000 and FY 2001, was $85.195 million, with estimated  cigarette tax revenue of
$81.79 million and cigar tax revenue of $3.41million.16
TABLE 4.  GEORGIA TOBACCO TAX REVENUES: FISCAL YEARS (FY) 1999-2003
Fiscal Year Cigar and Cigarette Tax Revenues 
1999 $92,153,743
2000 $87,056,144
2001 $83,334,653
2002 $84,833,963
2003 $82,091,779
Source: Office of Planning and Budget.
Higher state cigarette tax rates have an excellent record of raising state tax
revenues, although the factors determining the exact magnitudes are complex.  The past
performance cannot naively be used to project the effects of ongoing tax hikes,
especially in high tax states located in lower tax regions.17  While cigarette tax advocates
are correct that all past tax increases have increased state revenues (usually
substantially), the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids’(2003b) claim that “raising state
cigarette taxes always increases state revenues” applies to historical empirical evidence
and should not be interpreted as automatically applying to all future tax increases.  At
the same time, tax opponents such as the National Association of Convenience Stores
and analysts  such  as  Bruce  Bartlett  (2002  and  2003),  who  warn  about  the  dangers
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of assuming that tax revenues will increase, have been more effective in clarifying
factors that have merely restrained rather than negated tobacco tax revenue growth.  
Not all cigarette tax increases have met their proponents’ revenue expectations.
In Illinois, revenue increased by $13 million per month compared to the expected $19
million over the first six months following its 40 cent tax hike in 2002 (St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 2002).18   Nevertheless, increasing cigarette excise taxes has been a reliable
strategy for generating more state revenues, especially in the early years following the
increase, and at times there have been surprisingly strong short term revenues gains;
Michigan’s 50 cent increase in August 2002 generated revenue that exceeded
expectations by an annual rate of $2 million.19
The expected increase in revenue from a tobacco or cigarette tax increase can be
estimated in two primary ways: (1) by evaluating past tax increases in other states and
(2) by applying an estimated price elasticity of demand20 for cigarette consumption and
adjusting for the effects of various forms of tax avoidance and evasion.  Both approaches
are used here to derive a plausible range of revenue increases in Georgia from the
recently enacted 25 cents a pack increase.  In subsection D we present estimates for a
further increase in the cigarette tax to 58 cents per pack, which was the governor’s
original proposal.  
B.  Experience of Other States
The standard source for documenting the historical experience of tobacco
taxation is the annual report of Orzechowski and Walker (2001 is used here), Tax Burden
on Tobacco; both Farrelly et al. (2003) and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2003a)
cite that report as their primary source for their respective documentation of selected
state experience with tax increases.  We selected 23 cases of tax increases for our
analysis using two criteria: (1) the tax increase occurred between 1997 and 2000, which
allows comparisons of the last full fiscal year prior to the tax increase with the first full
fiscal year after the increase; or (2) the tax increase occurred between 1990 and 1996
and  was  20  cents  or  more per pack.  The cases are reported in Table 5.  The tax
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TABLE 5.  CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX INCREASES (PER PACK): SELECTED
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (1 YEAR AFTER TAX HIKE)
State Year
Tax 
Change
(cents)
Tax
Change
(percent)
New
Tax
Consumption
Decline
(percent)
Revenue
Increase
(percent)
Revenue
Increase
($ millions)
Alaska 97 71 244.8 100 -13.5 201.8 28.7
Arizona 94 40 222.2 58 -2.1 221.6 116.0
California 99 50 135.1 87 -18.9 90.7 555.4
Hawaii 97 20 33.3 80 -33.6 21.6 6.906
Hawaii 98 20 25.0 100 -8.1 19.9 6.4*
Illinois 97 14 31.8 58 -8.9 19.0 77.4
Maine 97 37  100.0 74 -15.5 66.7 30.8
Maryland 92 20 125.0 36 -15.3 130.4 79.1
Maryland 99 30 83.3 66 -16.3 53.9 69.0
Mass. 93 25 96.2 51 -14.7 68.1 95.7
Mass. 96 25 49.0 76 -14.3 28.0 64.1
Michigan 94 50 200.0 75 -20.8 139.9 341.0
N. Hamp. 97 12 48.0 37 -.6 45.5 22.5
N. Hamp. 99 15 40.5 52 -10.3 26.2 19.2
N. Jersey 98 40 100.0 80 -16.8 68.5 166.6
New York 00 55 98.2 111 -24.48 52.42 352.1 **
Oregon 97 30 78.9 68 -8.3 77.0 79.8
Rh. Island 97 10 16.4 71 -3.7 13.3 7.09 +
Utah 97 25 94.3 51.5 -25.7 42.4 12.7 ++
Vermont 95 24 120.0 44 -19.4 81.7 11.3 ^
Wash. 93 20 58.8 54 -9.1 49.5 65.5
Wash. 95 25 46.3 79 -13.6 28.3 56.1
Table 5 continues next page...
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED).  CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX INCREASES (PER PACK): SELECTED
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (1 YEAR AFTER TAX HIKE)
State Year
Tax 
Change
(cents)
Tax
Change
(percent)
New
Tax
Consumption
Decline
(percent)
Revenue
Increase
(percent)
Revenue
Increase
($ millions)
Wisconsin 97 15 34.1 59 - 6.5 25.8 52.9
Source: Adapted from Table A-1, “Sales and Cigarette Excise Tax Revenue,” Farrelly et al. (2003) and the
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (CTFK) (2003b), Table of “Recent State Experiences with Cigarette Tax
Increases.”  
Notes: * Farrelly et al. (2003) report $6.096 in higher revenue. ** Farrelly et al. (2003) report $365.0 in
higher revenue. + CTFK reports $8.6 in higher revenues. ++ Farrelly et al. (2003) report $21.5 in higher
revenue. ^ CTFK report $11.7 in higher revenues. 
increases between 1997 and 2000 provide sufficiently recent evidence to incorporate the
effects of expanding internet sales and intensifying anti-smoking publicity campaigns.21
The simplest approach to estimating the likely effects of the Georgia cigarette
tax increase on state tax revenues is to derive the elasticity of revenue with respect to tax
rates.  This elasticity is measured as the percentage change in state revenues divided by
the percentage change in tax rates.22  While this is a relatively crude measure that does
not directly assess the effects of higher cigarette taxes on retail prices and consumption,
or control for geographic location and relative tax rates in neighboring states, the tax
elasticity of revenues is not an uncommon summary measure used in tax analysis.  It has
the merit of being derivable over 23 state cases and 8 years, including time periods when
the variance in tax-inclusive retail cigarette prices was not as great as in the past few
years following the flurry of significant tax increases.23 
The average tax elasticity of revenue for the 23 cases listed in Table 5 is 0.731,
implying that, e.g., a 100 percent increase in the cigarette tax rate increases state
revenues by about 73 percent.  The range of the tax revenue elasticities is 0.45 to 1.04,
but the elasticities of 15 of the 23 states fall between 0.6 and 0.85.  Georgia’s tax
increase of 25 cents a pack (from 12 cents to 37 cents) is a 208 percent increase, which
using a revenue elasticity of 0.73, yields an expected increase in cigarette tax revenue
of 152 percent (= 0.73 x 208 percent).  Of the three states that increased tax rates by 200
percent or more (Alaska in 1997; Arizona in 1994; and Michigan in 1994) the average
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revenue elasticity is 0.84.  This elasticity suggests a revenue gain of 175 percent (= 0.84
x 208).  We use these two percentage changes for our revenue calculations.
The total cigar and cigarette tax revenue in Georgia for FY 2002 was $84.834
million (constituting, as noted above, almost entirely cigarette excise tax revenues). FY
2003 revenue was $82 million, which is slightly below the average of FY 2000 and 2001,
$85.195 million.  Rather than using the most recent year, which reflects a recessionary
level, we average the previous three years and use $85.15 million, as the base pre-tax
annual cigar and cigarette tax revenue.
A 152 percent increase in revenue applied to the $85.15 million base revenue
yields an estimated $214.55 million in total tobacco tax revenue (ignoring the new tax
on smokeless tobacco) for FY 2004.  A 175 percent increase yields an estimate of
$234.16 million.  These imply revenue increases of $127.47 million and $149.01 million,
respectively, in cigarette and cigar tax revenues.24  The estimate is not adjusted for any
possible offsetting lost of sales tax or lottery revenue, which are discussed below. 
C.   The Price Elasticity of Demand Approach 
A second approach to estimating the revenue increase relies on econometric
estimates of the demand for cigarette demand.  There have been many cross-sectional
and a few longitudinal econometric demand studies, which provide estimates of the price
elasticity of demand.  These estimates generally range from -0.3 to -0.5 when controlling
for cross-border activities (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).  But
estimated elasticities are higher (e.g. -0.71) when tobacco industry oligopoly structure
is factored into the estimation (Barnett et al., 1995).  Price elasticity estimates are much
higher for young smokers (e.g., Douglas, 1998), as high as -1.44 for youths between 12
and 17 (Lewit et al, 1981), and -0.89 for 20-25 year olds (Lewit and Coate, 1982).
Furthermore, more recent price elasticity estimates for college students are as high as -
1.4 (Chaloupka and Wechsler, 1997), nearly identical to the earlier result for 12-17 year
olds (Lewit et al., 1981).  Using data from the 1992, 1993 and 1994 “Monitoring the
Future Survey,” an overall price elasticity of -1.313 was found for youth cigarette
demand (Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996).  More refined analysis has shown that young
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men are more price responsive than women, and African Americans are more price
responsive than whites (Chaloupka and Pacula, 1999; Farrelly et al. 2001).  In their
recent study of the effects of cigarette taxes on smoking surrounding pregnancies,
Colman et al. (2003) estimated the price elasticity of “prenatal quitting and postpartum
relapse” as close to -1.0.
Guhl (2003) is an excellent recent example of a tobacco tax revenue study using
the price elasticity of demand approach (further details of his research are provided in
Appendix A.)  Building on previous cigarette demand models, especially those focusing
special attention on both organized smuggling and more informal bootlegging,25  Guhl
uses 30 years of time series data (1970-2000) to estimate a demand function for in-state
cigarette purchases, with the dependent variable defined as “annual per capita packs of
cigarettes sold in West Virginia.”  His key independent variable is the real (i.e., inflation
adjusted) cigarette price per pack in West Virginia.
Two of Guhl’s results are particularly important.  First, he finds that an increase
in the real price per pack of 10 cents reduces the taxable quantity of cigarettes by 1.78
packs per capita.  Based on the price and quantity of cigarettes in West Virginia, this
suggests a price elasticity of cigarette demand of -0.46, which is in the range of elasticity
values reported above.   Second, Guhl found no effect of bootlegging and concludes that
“the amount of bootlegged cigarettes does not significantly change the match between
in-state cigarette sales and West Virginia consumption” (p. 819).  
These results can be applied to the Georgia case (as further detailed in  Appendix
A).  We assume that the average retail per pack price (prior to the tax increase) in
Georgia was $2.76.26, 27 This implies a 9.06 percent retail price increase due to the 25
cent tax increase.
 A key issue relates to the per capita consumption in Georgia.  As noted above,
since cigarette excise taxes commonly generate nearly all of a state’s tobacco tax
revenues, a simplifying assumption can be made that the entire $85.15 million in tobacco
tax revenue was generated by the original 12 cent cigarette tax.  This implies total
taxable cigarette consumption of 709.583 million packs (85.15 million /0.12), or 86.68
packs per capita (given a total state population of 8.186 million).  This yields a price
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elasticity of demand of -0.566.28  Thus, a 25 cent increase in the tax rate yields a first-
year state revenue estimate of $249.06 million, an increase of $163.91 million from the
base of $85.15 million.29 It also results in a reduction in consumption of 4.45 packs per
capita.
Using the same methodology, we also estimated the revenue effect using the
price elasticity of -0.46 derived by Guhl for West Virginia and the lower bound estimate
of -0.3 reported by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2000).   For the
former, a 25 cent increase in cigarette tax yields an estimated increase in revenue of
$166.45 million, while for a price elasticity of -0.3, the increase in revenue is estimated
to be $170.24 million. 
D.  Summary of Tax Revenue Projections: Two Approaches
The results derived above for the 25 cent cigarette tax increase are summarized
in Table 6, along with an extension of those results to the potential case of a subsequent
21 cent increase to 58 cents, reflecting Governor Purdue’s original proposal of a 46 cent
increase.  The tax elasticity of revenue approach linked to the 23 cases of past tax
increases described in Table 5 generated two estimates based on tax revenue elasticities
of 0.731 and 0.844, yielding estimated revenue increases for the 25 cent tax increase of
$129.47 and $149.01, respectively.  The results for an elasticity of 0.844 are cited in
Table 6 for the original 25 cent tax increase.
The price elasticity approach demonstrated that the results of a 25 cent tax
increase varied from an increase of $163.91 million (using an elasticity of -0.566) to
$170.24 million (using an elasticity of -0.3), with an intermediate value of $166.45
(using  an  elasticity  of  -0.46).   We report $163.91 million, i.e., the lowest estimate in
Table 6, and use the elasticity of -0.566 as a foundation for the subsequent analysis of
an additional 21 cent tax increase.30
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TABLE 6.  CIGARETTE (CIGAR) TAX REVENUE PROJECTIONS (25 CENT INCREASE / 46
CENT INCREASE)
Price Elasticity Approach
Tax/Revenue Elasticity
Approach
Tax Rate 12 cents 37 cents 58 cents 12 cents 37 cents 58 cents
Base packs / person,
FY 03
86.68 86.68 86.68 NA NA NA
Base total packs,
millions
709.58 709.58 709.58 NA NA NA
Base tax revenue $
mill. 
85.15 85.15 85.15 85.15 85.15 85.15
Base retail price, $ 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76
% tax change - 208.33 56.76 - 208.33 56.76
% price change - 9.06 6.98 - 9.06 6.98
Elasticity - -0.566 -0.651 - 0.84 0.72
New retail price, $ - 3.01 3.22 - 3.01 3.22
New packs / person,
FY 04 or FY 05 - 82.23 78.49 NA NA NA
New total packs,
millions - 673.14 642.60 NA NA NA
New total tax
revenue $ mill. - 249.06 372.71 - 234.16 319.65
Increase in total
revenue $ mill.
- 163.91 287.56*
123.65**
- 149.01 234.51*
85.49**
% change revenue - 192.50 337.71*
49.65**
- 175.00 275.41*
36.51**
NA signifies “not applicable.”
*Revenue from an increase in the tax rate from 12 cents to 58 cents, i.e., 46 cents. 
**Revenue from an increase in the tax rate from 37 cents to 58 cents, i.e., 21 cents.
Note: 12 cents was the tax rate prior to July 1, 2003; 37 cents is the current tax rate; 58 cents
would be the tax rate from a further 21 cent tax increase.
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Now consider the increase in the tax rate from 37 cents to 58 cents.  For the
revenue elasticity method, we use an elasticity of 0.72, which is the average for five
states  where  the  tax  increased  between  40  and  60  percent, since a second round tax
increase of 21 cents would represent  a 56.76 percent increase in the tax rate.  This yields
an estimated additional revenue increase of $85.49 million, in addition to the revenue
generated by the 25 cent tax, for a total revenue gain of $234.51 million from a 46 cents
tax increase.
One of the advantages of Guhl’s estimation procedure is that the price elasticity
is not constant, and with higher prices demand becomes more responsive to price
changes, consistent with standard economic theory.  Thus, for the price elasticity
approach, the relevant price elasticity is -0.651.  This implies an increase in tobacco tax
revenue of $123.65 million from an additional 21 cent tax increase, or a total of
$287.56.31 
The estimates in Table 6 can be summarized as follows, remembering that these
results reflect the estimated first fiscal year revenues and are not adjusted for any loss in
sales tax revenues due to the lower quantity of cigarettes sold (see below):
! Both approaches predict that the 25 cent tax increase will generate
substantial new state revenues ranging from $149.01 million (the tax
elasticity of revenue approach) to $163.91 million (the price elasticity
approach), with the latter approach being more consistent with models of
revenue projection derived from the academic tax literature;
! While those revenue estimates fall short of the highest projection often
appearing in press reports ($180 million), they are fully consistent with
other more modest projections that were being generated at the time the
tax proposals were being considered;
! If the legislature had passed the governor’s original tax proposal for a 46
cent hike to a tax of 58 cents per pack, the first fiscal year projections are
for revenue gains of between $234.51 and $287.56 million, short of the
higher than $300 million estimate sometimes reported, but quite substantial
increases in annual tobacco tax revenue of between about 275 to 338
percent;
! These projections for the 46 cent hike are fully applicable to the
consideration of a possible second round tax increase of another 21 cents
following the original 25 cent increase, since the elasticities used under
both approaches incorporated realistic conservative adjustments (a higher
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price elasticity of cigarette demand and a lower tax elasticity of revenue,
as  retail  prices  increased).   Of  course,  if  measured  relative  to the now
higher projected revenues from the first-round increase, those subsequent
gains are more modest at between $85.49 to $123.65 million (i.e.
percentage gains of between 36.51 and 49.65 percent).
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IV.  Adjustments to Revenue Estimates 
In this section we consider revenue reductions from other revenue sources (sales
tax, Lottery revenue, and tax avoidance and evasion efforts) due to an increase in the
tobacco tax rate. 
A.  Sales Tax Adjustment
As incorporated into the above calculations, Georgia does not apply its 4.0
percent sales tax to that portion of the retail cigarette prices represented by its state
cigarette tax.32  This means that prior to the 2003 tax increase, no sales tax was earned
on 12 cents of that retail price, and after the increase, no sales tax will be earned on the
additional 25 cent portion of the new retail price.   However, assuming that $2.76 was
the base price per pack, sales taxes were earned on $2.64 per pack and should have
yielded $74.932 million in sales tax revenue from cigarette sales.33
Based on the projected drop in total packs sold to 673.14 million following the
25 cent tax increase, new total taxable sales would be $1,777.1 million, yielding state
sales tax revenues of $71.084 million from cigarette sales.  This amounts to a loss of
sales tax revenue of $3.848 million. 
 Extending this analysis to the possible effect of a subsequent 21 cent excise tax
increase, total cigarette packs sold are projected to fall to 642.60 million. This results in
an additional loss of $3.227 million in sales tax revenue, for a total loss of $7.075 million
relative to the original base period of FY2003.34  If these state sales tax revenue losses
are subtracted from the revenue projections summarized in Table 6, the 25 cigarette tax
increase net effect on state revenues would be $160.06 million instead of $163.91, and
the supplemental potential 21 cent tax increase would generate an additional $120.42
million instead of $123.65 million.
Note that these sales tax losses are limited to cigarette sales only.  Additional
revenue losses could arise if those Georgia residents who cross state boundaries to buy
cheaper cigarettes also purchase fewer other taxable commodities within Georgia.  The
likely magnitude of such effects relates more generally to the question of the seriousness
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of tax avoidance and evasion, which is discussed below. 
B.  Possible Georgia Lottery Net Revenue Adjustment
The gross Lottery revenues were $2.449 billion in FY2002, increasing to a
record $2.604 million for FY 2003 (Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2003f), with net
proceeds transferred to the Lottery for Education Account increasing from $726.2
million in FY2002 to more than $750 million in FY2003 (figures also from the Georgia
Lottery Corporation, 2002).  In addition to a loss of sales tax revenue, there is a potential
for a lost of Georgia Lottery revenue.  Such losses could occur if fewer people buy
lottery tickets because they either 1) reduce their trips to retail outlets within Georgia to
buy cigarettes, or 2) shift retail purchases to outlets located in neighboring states.
However, the current dearth of competing state lotteries in neighboring states will exert
an offsetting effect.
While Florida has a popular lottery, the cigarette tax differential between Georgia
and Florida is only 3.1 cents.  While the tax differential with Tennessee is 17 cents, the
pending Tennessee Lottery may have minimal effects due to the relatively small Georgia
county populations bordering that state.  A lottery in South Carolina, which has been a
major political issue, would be a bigger threat given that state’s 7 cent cigarette tax and
the larger Georgia population bordering South Carolina.
Even if Georgians made more shopping trips across state boundaries, the effect
on Lottery sales is likely to be minimal.  Guhl (2003) and others who have studied cross-
border shopping for cigarettes generally focus on the relevant populations in bordering
counties since any defensible economic model would compare the potential savings from
buying cheaper cigarettes to the required higher travel costs, which depends on distance
traveled.
Table 7 documents the 2002 Georgia population living in counties sharing a
border  with  particular  neighboring  states,  the  average  growth  rates  in  those  county
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TABLE 7.  POTENTIAL GEORGIA BOOTLEGGING POPULATION AND RELATED
STATISTICS (2002-2003)
County Pop. 2002
Avg.%
pop.
growth
2000-02
Lung
cancer
death rate State(s)
Cigarette. Tax
Differential (cents
higher in GA) / 
Border size (L, M, S)
Rabun 15,521 1.6 76.9* NC
SC
32 / L 
30 / L 
Habersham 37,979 2.57 55.1* SC 30 / S
Stephens 25,712 0.60 73.9* SC 30 / L
Franklin 20,778 1.23 47.6 SC 30 / S
Hart 23,249 0.73 69.2* SC 30 / L
Elbert 20,667 0.37 58.0* SC 30 / L
Lincoln 8,459 0.56 74.0* SC 30 / L
Columbia 94,958 2.56 47.8 SC 30 / L
Richmond 197,842 -0.27 53.3* SC 30 / L
Burke 22,794 0.96 45.7 SC 30 / L
Screven 15,201 -0.10 78.2* SC 30 / L
Effingham 40,832 3.50 38.3 SC 30 / L
Chatham 233,702 0.30 61.0* SC 30 / L
Camden 44,702 0.83 20 FL 3.1 / L
Charlton 10,553 0.90 66.8* FL 3.1 / L
Ware 35,558 0.00 115.3* FL 3.1 / M
Clinch 6,904 0.03 75.1* FL 3.1 / M
Echols 3,842 2.70 < 1.0 FL 3.1 / L
Lanier 7,216 0.43 67.4* FL 3.1 / S
Lowndes 93,658 0.76 61.4* FL 3.1 / L
Brooks 16,428 0.10 81.1* FL 3.1 / L
Thomas 42,976 0.46 76.0* FL 3.1 / L
Grady 23,838 0.37 56.0* FL 3.1 / L
Table 7 continues next page...
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RELATED STATISTICS (2002-2003)
County Pop. 2002
Avg.%
pop.
growth
2000-02
Lung
cancer
death rate State(s)
Cigarette. Tax
Differential (cents
higher in GA) / 
Border size (L, M, S)
Decatur 28,243 0.20 69.8* FL 3.1 / L
Seminole 9,310 -0.10 69.5* FL
AL
3.1 / S
20.5 / L
Early 12,172 -0.40 81.9* AL 20.5 / L
Clay 3,392 0.42  < 1.0 AL 20.5 / L
Quitman 2,621 0.73  < 1.0 AL 20.5 / L
Stewart 5,040 -1.47 93.4* AL 20.5 / L
Chattahoochee 15,440 1.46 16.4 AL 20.5 / M
Muscogee 185,948 0.03 60.9* AL 20.5 / L
Harris 25,092 2.37 71.4* AL 20.5 / L
Troup 59,767 0.80 75.7* AL 20.5 / L
Heard 11,340 1.86 78.7* AL 20.5 / L
Carroll 94,907 3.73 55.0* AL 20.5 / L
Haralson 26,755 1.86 61.7* AL 20.5 / L
Polk 39,444 1.40 77.0* AL 20.5 / L
Floyd 92,606 1.06 79.5* AL 20.5 / L
Chattooga 26,161 1.30 91.3* AL 20.5 / L
Walker 61,949 0.56 99.3* AL
TN
20.5 / L
17 / L
Whitfield 87,037 1.80 51.1 TN 17 / M
Murray 38,544 2.76 74.9* TN 17 / M
Fannin 20,986 2.57 127.6* TN 17 / L
Union 18,275 2.73 71.2* TN 17 / M
Towns 9,768 2.27 95.8* NC
TN
32 / L
17 / L
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RELATED STATISTICS (2002-2003)
County Pop. 2002
Avg.%
pop.
growth
2000-02
Lung
cancer
death rate State(s)
Cigarette. Tax
Differential (cents
higher in GA) / 
Border size (L, M, S)
Border Pop. x
.765 (rate of
adults in pop.)
x .235 (GA
adult smoking
rate)
1,907,412
(total) 
342,905
(adult
smokers)
% GA Adult
Pop. (6.017
mill)
5.70
Border Pop.
w/o Florida / 
Adult Smokers
1,584,204 /
284,800
% GA Pop.      4.73
Note: Lung cancer death rates are defined as “deaths per 100,000 population.”
*The death rate exceeds the state average of 51.9.
populations  since  2000,  and  the  relevant  cigarette  tax differential as of July 2003,
which is a rough proxy for the more relevant per pack (carton) retail price differential.
In an attempt to capture variation in the fraction of a county’s population that lives close
to the border, Table 7 also includes a qualitative measure of whether the common
border(s) are “large (L), medium (M) or small (S)” relative to the size of the Georgia
county.  The counties are listed clockwise geographically starting in the northeast corner
of the state.
Clearly, other variables beyond population are relevant to a full evaluation of the
potential bootlegging population.35 We report the combined 1994 and 2001 county-
specific lung cancer mortality rates (defined as deaths per 100,000 population) as a proxy
for the magnitude of smoking intensity in specific counties.36  Smoking intensity, even
more than mere smoking rates, may well be a better predictor of the propensity of 
The Economics of Cigarette Taxation:
Lessons for Georgia
32
cigarette consumers to devote time and energy to seeking cheaper cigarettes in bordering
states. 
Table 7 suggest the following conclusions:
! The total adult population with potentially significant bootlegging
incentives is 284,800, which constitutes only 4.73 percent of the adult
Georgia population.37  This population does not include those counties
bordering Florida, since the cigarette tax differential of only 3.1 cents
provides a minimal incentive for widespread bootlegging.
! The smallest potential adult population with significant bootlegging
incentives could be calculated by further eliminating any county with
either a below average death rate from lung cancer or a geographical
border area designated as small (S).  These adjustments yield a border
population of adult smokers of 137,211, or 2.3 percent of the Georgia
population. 
! This 2.3 percent “lowest” relevant bootlegging population should be
contrasted with the Florida inclusive “highest” relevant population of 5.7
percent of the Georgia adult population (342,905) to establish the most
likely range.
! Given the popularity of the lottery and the implausibility of all border
county smokers engaging in significant cigarette tax evasion activities, a
defensible projection might be that 20 percent of border county smokers
reduce their lottery purchases by 25 percent.  If 20 percent of lottery
proceeds come from non-Georgians, then  lottery proceeds per Georgian
are $73.57.  This results in an estimated Georgia lottery revenue loss of
$1.05 million (substantially less than 1.0 percent of gross, or even net
revenues). Including the counties bordering Florida increases the loss to
$1.26 million, still a trivial reduction in lottery revenues. 
C.  Cross-Border, Smuggling, and Internet Sales
The estimated reduction in cigarette packs purchased in Georgia of 36.44 million
resulting from the 25 cent tax increase (Table 6) stems both from a genuine reductions
in cigarettes consumed and from purchases that escape the Georgia cigarette tax.  It is
important to distinguish between the three key forms of tobacco tax evasion.  First,
individual consumers living primarily in bordering jurisdictions with differential tax rates
are potential participants in cross-border shopping, trafficking in small per capita
quantities for their personal use in order to avoid Georgia’s cigarette tax.  Second,
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organized smuggling, which is big business (netting the smuggler as much as $10,000-
$15,000 per van load (Cox III, 2002)) and is not as dependent on specific border county
distance proximity and relative populations.38  Third, mail order, and more recently
internet sales (especially from Indian Reservation websites). 
Organized smuggling is big business but the magnitude of such smuggling is
unknown.  It has been subject to specific legal attack under the post-World War II
Jenkins Act, directed against wholesale smuggling operations, and later the Contraband
Cigarette Act (CCA) of 1978, “prohibiting single shipments, sale or purchase of more
than 60,000 cigarettes not bearing the tax indicia of the state in which they are found,”
which may have ironically increased smuggling due to unexpected reactions of
enforcement agencies to passage of the law (Thursby and Thursby, 1994).39  Regardless
of the effects of the Act itself (Warner, 1982, provides a more balanced view), it was
motivated by the findings of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
in a 1977 study, Cigarette Bootlegging: A State and Federal Responsibility, which found
evidence of substantial smuggling of cigarettes from the tobacco producing states to the
Northeastern states, and that the 22 states (not including Georgia) with the most serious
problem were losing between about 10 to 20 percent of their cigarette tax revenues.   
There have been few studies regarding mail order, and more recently internet
sales.  However, this activity is clearly growing, with as many as 200 U.S. sites (up from
40 as recently as 2000; see GAO (2002) and Bryant et al. (2002)), and a similar number
of foreign-based sites selling to American smokers.  These sales represent 2 percent of
current consumption but potentially as much as 14 percent by 2005.40  This has drawn
the attention of the U.S. Congress, with Senate Bill 1177 (the PACT Act) introduced in
2003 to strengthen the Jenkins Act by applying it to mail order and internet sales.  This
proposal  has drawn intense and organized resistance from on-line sellers, warning their
customers against this effort to “prevent you from purchasing the cigarette brand of your
choice over the internet” (www.otdirect.com/otinfo.html).  However, with projections
of  possible  tax revenue losses as high as $200 million across all states in 2001 and short
The Economics of Cigarette Taxation:
Lessons for Georgia
34
run projections as high as $1.4 billion (Rubin et al., 2001), expanded legal efforts to
restrict such sales are inevitable.
On the other hand, press reports of the behavior of Ohioans (facing a 55 per pack
tax versus 3 cents in Kentucky) suggest that potential cross-border shoppers find it “too
much of a hassle driving to Kentucky for cheaper smokes,” leading to the common
conclusion that while some smokers will go out of their way to avoid the higher taxes,
“most, however, keep on smoking and paying” (Cincinnati Enquirer, 2003).41
What more can be learned from serious research about the likely magnitudes of
such tax evasion?  Guhl (2003) viewed his finding of a minimal impact from cross-state
shopping as “particularly remarkable” in the face of the high real cigarette prices in West
Virginia throughout the 1970s and 1980s, not just relative to Virginia, Kentucky and
Maryland but also to Ohio and Pennsylvania in certain years.   This finding is consistent
not only with the above discussion, but with the New York evidence from its 2000 tax
increase of 55 cents per pack.  In  the first year New York collected additional revenue
of $352.1 million (Table 4), which was followed by a second year revenue increase of
about another $50 million.  As suggested by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
(2003b), this result suggests a return to normal shopping patterns following an initial
enthusiasm for cross-border, internet and even black market shopping, a conclusion
reached more generally by Farrelly et al. (2003, pp 8-9).42
However, the broader academic research on cross-border cigarette sales and the
longer term revenue effects of higher excise taxes is not as uniformly optimistic,43 and
in fact provides some serious warnings about the potential magnitude of the bootlegging,
smuggling and internet sales problem.   Such tax avoidance and evasion clearly rises as
the differentials among taxing jurisdictions increases, although the magnitude of the
problem can vary greatly.  
The magnitude of cross-border consumption effects is important for more than
just the accurate estimation of state revenues.  If most of the reduction in state cigarette
sales can be traced to cross-border sales, the beneficial health effects from higher taxes
will be limited.  The first (1977) Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations
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(ACIR) study concluded that 40 percent of in-state sales effects from higher cigarette
taxes was due to lower cigarette consumption, and 60 percent linked to cross-border
sales.  However, in 1985 a second ACIR study reached a dramatically different
conclusion, finding that 75 percent of the sales effect of a higher cigarette tax was due
to reduced smoking and 25 percent due to bootlegging or smuggling.  Therefore, the
reason for any observed reduction in state cigarette sales has been highly controversial.
While a detailed survey of the academic literature on this important topic is
provided in Appendix B, the overall results can be summarized here.  The substantial
research literature on cross-border consumption changes resulting from differential tax
rates is clearly varied, but the following general observations can be made: 
1. The magnitude of cross-border effects due to general sales taxes exceeds
those of selective excise taxes.
2. Cross-border shopping effects are likely to be greater at the city level than
at the state level,  consistent with the presumption that the more narrowly
defined the geographic area, the more options are available for cross-
border “outside” shopping. 
3. The price elasticity of demand for in-state cigarettes is almost uniformly
inelastic (less than 1 in absolute value), although unrestricted elasticities
that incorporate cross-border effects are always higher than “naive”
elasticities that ignore them.
4. Most studies find that cross-border consumption effects are relatively
small in magnitude, but can be significant in important selected cases.
5. Nothing in these past studies suggests that the revenue projections derived
for Georgia (Table 6) resulting from the 25 cent tax increase or a potential
supplemental 21 cent increase are in error, although modifications
suggested by some of the studies could lower those projections by about
4 percent. 
6. Similarly, nothing in this literature review suggests any substantial error
in the analysis related to the likely minimal effects in Georgia of
bootlegging and lost Georgia Lottery proceeds following the 2003 tax
increase (Table 7), although that analysis was not germane to the issue of
more organized cigarette smuggling or internet sales. 
7. To the extent that cross-border effects are the primary cause of any decline
in state cigarette sales, as suggested by the 1977 (but not the 1985) ACIR
study, and later suggested by Coats (1995), the beneficial health claims of
anti-smoking advocates for higher cigarette taxes will be lessened, even
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though the higher state revenue claims are confirmed by the low overall
magnitudes of the estimated state price elasticities of cigarette demand. 
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V.  A Brief Review of Health Benefit Claims 
      Stemming from Higher Tobacco Taxes
Almost no one disputes that tobacco use is the single most preventable cause of
death in the United States, and that quitting smoking significantly decreases a person’s
risk of lung cancer, stroke, respiratory illness, and heart attack.  Thus, commonly
specified benefits from higher cigarette taxes are similar to those listed for Georgia by
the Campaign for Tobacco Free-Kids (2002).44 The following are the estimated benefits
that result from a 25 cent tax increase.45 
! Fewer packs of cigarettes smoked per year: 21.2 million;
! Increase in total number of kids alive today who will not become smokers:
28,740;
! Number of adult smokers in the state who would quit: 20,333;
! Number of smoking-affected births avoided over the next five years:
3,067;
! Number of current adult smokers saved from smoking-caused death:
4,467;
! Number of kids alive today saved from premature smoking-caused death:
9,200;
! 5-year healthcare savings from fewer smoking-affected pregnancies and
births: $3.5 million;
! 5-year healthcare savings from fewer smoking-caused heart attacks and
strokes: $7.1 million;
! Long-term healthcare savings in state from adult and youth smoking
declines: $510 million. 
Health experts and economists may dispute the magnitudes of any one of these
particular claims, especially the measurement of the long-term healthcare dollar savings
which might not fully adjust for the longer life expectancies that are predicted to arise
from smoking reductions.  Longer life expectancies also generate greater financial
liabilities to governments from various pension and related social insurance programs.
However, it is clear that almost all of these benefits stem from the prediction that
a 25 cent increase in Georgia’s cigarette tax will reduce smoking by 21.2 million packs
per year.  The supplemental assumption is that kids will be more affected by the tax
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increase than adults, as indicated by the roughly 40 percent higher predicted number of
kids who will not become smokers relative to the adults who will quit, and the prediction
that twice as many kids will be spared a premature smoking related death than adults.
Is a reduction by 21.2 million packs per year a defensible projection?
Based on the revenue projections and the analysis of bootlegging and related tax
avoidance behaviors provided above, the answer is “yes” for five interrelated reasons:
1. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids also predicted that had the tax
increase been as high as 75 cents, the tax increase would have generated
$472.2 million in additional revenues.  Applying a simple proportionality
of tax rates (25 cent relative to 75 cents), the 25 cent tax increase would
be predicted to generate one-third as much revenue, or $157.4 million.  A
less than proportional claim made by the same group was $168 million.
2. This $157.4 million projection is remarkably close to the average of the
two revenue projections summarized in Table 6.  The price elasticity
approach generated a predicted increase of $163.91 million in the first year
(close to the higher $168 million projection), while the tax rate elasticity
of revenue approach yielded a more conservative $149.01 million
prediction.  The simple average of these two projections is $156.46
million.
3. The price elasticity approach generated a predicted reduction in the total
number of annual packs of cigarettes sold in Georgia of 36.44 million
packs (from 709.58 to 673.14 million). 
4. A predicted reduction of actual smoking by 21.2 million packs when there
was a reduction of packs sold in Georgia of 36.44 million packs implies
that 15.24 million packs would be smoked by Georgians but purchased
from lower price vendors outside the state.  This implies that of the total
reduction in state sales, 41.8 percent stemmed from a combination of
bootlegging, smuggling and internet sales, while 58.2 percent was the
result of legitimate smoking reductions.   As noted above, the first 1977
ACIR study of bootlegging reported that 40 percent of an average state’s
reduction in cigarette sales was the result of consumption falling while 60
percent was due to cross-border sales.  By 1985, the second ACIR report
found a significant change in these ratios, with consumption declines
accounting for 75 percent of the state sales reduction and only 25 percent
due to cross-border sales (due in large part to a narrowing of the state tax
differentials).46  With those state tax differentials rising again, it is likely
that the mix of consumption and cross-border factors may well be
somewhere between those figures for most states.  A simple average of the
60 percent and the later 25 percent cross-border factors yields 42.5
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percent, implying that 57.5 percent of the reduction in sales is due to
consumption declines.  Those ratios are remarkably close to the ones
derived from a combination of the Table 6 revenue analysis and the
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids assertion about the predicted decline in
actual smoking (41.8 percent cross-border versus 58.2 percent reduced
smoking).  While that similarity hardly proves that either the data in Table
6 or the Campaign for Tobacco Free-Kids analysis is correct, it does
indicate that those results are well within reasonable boundaries and can
be considered highly plausible.
5. The claim of a 21.2 million pack smoking reduction is also consistent with
the derivation of 1.783 million Georgia smokers, including about 1.414
million adults and 368,535 youths under age 18, and an average number
of packs per year for smokers of 398 (see endnote 37).  Dividing 21.2
million by 1.783 million smokers yields an average reduction per smoker
of a modest 11.89 packs per year.   If one also adjusted for the Campaign’s
claim that 20,333 adults would quite smoking outright and 28,700 youths
would not become smokers, one might reduce the number of continuing
smokers to 1.734 million.  This would require the average continuing
smoker to reduce smoking by a still quite modest 12.23 packs per year (the
equivalent of about 5 cigarettes per week).   Those are hardly exaggerated
claims, which strongly suggests that the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids’
prediction of a 21.2 million pack per year smoking reduction following a
25 cent tax increase is very defensible, and the claims stemming from that
prediction should be taken quite seriously.
It should also be noted that a recent review of the literature regarding youth
smoking by Liang et al. (2003) found strong confirmation for the claim that the effects
of higher cigarette prices are especially strong among the young: “The most consistent
finding in this literature is that higher cigarette prices discourage youth smoking” (p.
105).  To further elaborate, the authors note that “compared to the effects of cigarette
taxation and price on youth smoking, the evidence on the effectiveness of the youth
access laws and clean indoor air laws are still mixed and inconclusive” (p. 105).  Thus,
the claims made about the youth benefits of the higher Georgia cigarette tax are generally
supported by the research surveyed by Liang et al. (2003).  
There are two particular counter-claims made by cigarette tax opponents that still
must be addressed: (1) higher cigarette (and cigar) taxes will just encourage smokers and
potential smokers to shift toward equally or even more harmful smokeless tobacco
products (moist snuff and chewing tobacco), although there is no clear evidence that
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smokeless tobacco products are more harmful than smoking; and (2) reductions in the
number of packs consumed overstates the health benefits since smokers will simply
smoke each cigarette more completely, inhale more intensely, and/or shift to somewhat
higher tar and nicotine products to maintain their addiction.
The smokeless tobacco claim is easily dismissed in the Georgia case due to the
implementation, for the first time in the state, of a 10 percent ad valorem tax on
smokeless tobacco products.  Thus, while cigarette prices were increased by
approximately 9.1 percent, prices of smokeless tobacco products increased by a predicted
10 percent.  Therefore, even though the empirical evidence does indeed confirm the fear
that increasing cigarette taxes without offsetting taxes on smokeless tobacco will indeed
shift smokers toward more smokeless tobacco usage (Ohsfeldt et al., 1997), the argument
does not apply to this case.  The other claim about “more intense smoking” is much
harder to assess.  It is likely to be legitimate, but unlikely to be a significant enough
factor to significantly compromise the projected health benefits of a projected 21.2
million pack annual reduction in cigarette consumption.
In summary, while this report is not capable of confirming every health benefit
claim for the Georgia cigarette tax increase made by smoking opponents such as the
Campaign for Tobacco- Free Kids, nothing in this analysis nor in the academic literature
suggests that those claims are significantly overstated. 
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VI.   Tax Incidence: Who Pays the Cigarette Tax?
There is little dispute that cigarette (and other tobacco) excise taxes represent a
higher proportion of the incomes of low income consumers, i.e., that such taxes are
regressive.47  Not only do smoking rates consistently fall with education and income, but
more detailed studies of household spending habits reveal that cigarette expenditures are
about 3.2 percent of the income of those in the bottom one-fourth of the U.S. income
distribution, while making up only 0.4 percent of the budgets of those in the top one-
fourth (Gruber and Koszegi, 2002).
However, two interesting considerations might modify the magnitude of this
“perverse” distributional effect: (1) the relative response of low income smokers to
higher cigarette taxes, and (2) the relative “utility” value of reductions in smoking
following tax-induced retail price increases.  Empirical studies of cigarette price
elasticities generally show larger smoking reductions (including quit rates) among
younger than older smokers, and higher price elasticities among low- than high-income
consumers.  Farrelly and Bray (1998) estimated the lower-income price elasticity to be
-0.29 versus -0.17 for upper-income smokers.  Evans et al. (1999) reported that the price
elasticity was -0.322 for those below the median income level and -0.17 for those with
incomes higher than the median.48  To the extent that low-income smokers are motivated
to reduce smoking more than high-income smokers, the regressive disparity between
their relative tax burdens will be reduced to some degree.  
Furthermore, if, on average, low-income smokers reduce smoking more than
high-income smokers in response to tax-induced price increases, they will benefit
disproportionately from the health benefits that accompany lower smoking rates.  While
this will not apply to the truly addicted, one might argue that the subjective value of
being induced to exert greater self-control when the commitment to stop or reduce
smoking has been insufficiently strong will thus be greater for poorer relative to richer
smokers (Gruber and Koszegi, 2002).  Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) find that smokers
and potential smokers self-report increased levels of well-being in response to higher
cigarette taxes.  The higher average response rates to increased tobacco taxes among the
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poor, could then be used to infer a relatively higher benefit accruing to low- income
smokers, hence again moderating the degree to which such taxes are regressive. 
However, neither of these clarifications is generally thought sufficient to reverse the
conclusion that tobacco taxes are regressive (Gruber and Koszegi, 2002). 
While the variation of the tax burden by income level is the most commonly
stressed incidence issue, the smoking demographics in Georgia would also indicate that
the 2003 tax will be especially burdensome on (1) young adults aged 18-24, especially
white males; (2) Hispanics, especially males; (3) and those with less than a high school
education, holding income constant.  Of course, the higher price elasticities among
younger smokers generates a relatively larger reduction in consumption that modestly
reduces the tax burden for the 18-24 age group.
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VII. Potential Adverse Effects on the Georgia Tobacco
Manufacturing and Distributing Sectors: How Significant?
The most visible opposition to Georgia tobacco tax increases was led by the
Georgia Association of Convenience Stores (GACS).   In testimony to a subcommittee
of the Georgia legislature, GACS president Jim Tudor stressed that tobacco sales account
for about 40 percent of the merchandise sold in convenience stores, and that such stores
employ more than 56,000 workers in Georgia.49  The potential adverse effects on
Georgia retailers was also the focus of the analysis provided by the Communications and
Public Affairs department of Brown & Williamson (B & W).  B & W is the third largest
(10.7 percent market share) American cigarette manufacturer and employs 2,368 workers
at its Macon, Georgia cigarette manufacturing (and research and development) facilities
and domestic sales office in Atlanta.50
A reduction in cigarette sales in Georgia resulting from a 25 or 75 cent tax
increase will have no measurable economic impact on the tobacco manufacturing or
growing sectors.  The industry argued that there are large cross-border sales effects of
any Georgia tax increase, which implies that the primary effect will not be to reduce
overall cigarette consumption but rather to shift the location of cigarette sales.  Thus, it
is not surprising that, other than observing that “about 2,200 manufacturing jobs were
created in Georgia as a direct result of tobacco and cigarette production,” creating nearly
$100 million in annual compensation, there was minimal focus by cigarette tax
opponents on the manufacturing sector and even less on the tobacco growing industry
in Georgia.
In addition, the minimal size of the Georgia market for cigarette consumption
relative to the national and world markets, combined with the fact that the Brown and
Williamson share of the national market is only 10.7 percent and Georgia tobacco
growers account for less than 6 percent of total U.S. tobacco cash receipts, simply
renders implausible any argument that a 21.2 million pack reduction in actual smoking
in Georgia (the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2002) projection linked to the 25 cent
tax increase discussed above) could have any real effect on those Georgia sectors.  With
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about 610 billion cigarettes manufactured per year in the United States, roughly 25
percent exported to the rest of the world,51 the predicted drop in Georgia cigarettes
consumed is less than 0.07 percent of total production.  The recent decline in Brown and
Williamson employees in Georgia from 3,109 to 2,368 is clearly a reflection of the
ongoing decline in cigarette manufacturing driven by industry trends utterly unrelated
to Georgia.
However, opponents of higher cigarette tax make the following predictions about
commercial losses in Georgia linked to the distribution sector.  (These projected effects
were originally based on a potential tax increase of 75 cents.  Therefore the specific
numerical predictions are again proportionately adjusted to reflect the approximate
effects of the 25 cent tax change):  
! A 9.33 percent, or 61 million pack decline in cigarette sales within
Georgia, based on an initial 666 million packs prior to any tax increase,
with “many of these sales losses [being] to the low tax states on Georgia’s
borders” (B&W, 2003, p. 5);52
! A gross retail value loss of about $192.76 million (61 million packs valued
at a “final retail price of $3.16 per pack.”53  In addition, “sundry product
sales” normally bought in conjunction with tobacco products would fall by
about $53.33 million (cited as based on past studies by Price Waterhouse);
! Gross profit losses to Georgia retailers of about $46.67 million;
! A decline in convenience store cigarette sales of 35 million packs (57.4
percent of the total decline), generating an average loss of about $27,333
in cigarette plus sundry product sales and $5,000 in annual profits;  
! A loss of about 635 Georgia retailer and wholesaler jobs (cited as based on
a study by the American Economics Group). 
The foundation for much of these projections is an assessment of cross-border
sales effects that suggests a greater magnitude of that problem than was generally
implied by the research surveyed above.54  Since most of the examples cited relate to the
very high tax states of California, Massachusetts, Michigan and New York, they are
clearly not directly applicable to the Georgia case, where even after the 2003 tax increase
the state ranks as the 36th lowest tobacco taxing state in the country.  Even another 21
cent increase would change that ranking to the 27th lowest tax state, and that would occur
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only if none of the nine states with current tax rates between 37 and 58 cents also
increase their tax rates. 
While these particular predictions of reduced cigarette sales in Georgia exceed
those generated in the analysis above, it is noteworthy that even the suggested 635 jobs
lost due to the 2003 tax increase would impose minimal disruptions upon the Georgia
economy.  Even if accepted as fully accurate, despite the disruption that any job losses
would create to those workers (at least in the short run), this is an extremely small
proportion of total employment in the state.  Furthermore, the diversion of spending
away from cigarette sales to other products will create other jobs to partly or entirely
counterbalance those lost jobs. 
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VIII.  Summary and Conclusions
For the first time in thirty-two years, Georgia increased tobacco taxes in 2003.
The state excise tax on cigarette packs rose from 12 to 37 cents; the ad valorem tax on
cigars rose from 10 percent to 23 percent; and smokeless tobacco products were taxed
for the first time at the ad valorem rate of 10 percent.  Proponents of higher tobacco taxes
had supported much higher increases (e.g., a 75 cent increase in the cigarette tax),
making the following claims:
! Increases in taxes would significantly increase state revenues, with
projections for a 25 cent per pack cigarette tax increase typically ranging
from $145 to $180 million in additional revenues per year.
! In addition to providing a boost to lagging state revenues, noteworthy
health benefits would result from reductions in smoking, especially among
young people.
! Revenue losses (linked to tobacco products themselves, as well as general
sales tax revenues or Georgia lottery funds) from the loss of convenience
store sales near state borders, or resulting from more organized cigarette
smuggling or internet shopping would be relatively minor.
! Similarly, any job losses in the tobacco growing and cigarette
manufacturing sectors could be largely ignored since Georgia tobacco
consumers play a small role in the national and international markets for
tobacco products.  Tobacco distribution (largely convenience store) jobs
losses would occur, but be short term and limited geographically.
! While such taxes are generally regressive, such adverse distributional
effects would be smaller than often claimed, and outweighed by the
efficiency gains stemming from a reduction in excessive smoking and
tobacco abuse.
A thorough analysis of these claims in the context of the 2003 tax hikes reveals
the following:
! Even after the 2003 tax increase, Georgia ranks 36th of 51 (including the
District of Columbia) regarding its state cigarette excise tax, with New
Jersey being the highest (number 1) at a per pack tax of $2.05 and Virginia
ranked number 51 at only 2.5 cents (although fifty cities within the state
have the option of imposing their own tax of up to 60 cents per pack).
Georgia’s long time rate of 12 cents per pack, when adjusted for inflation
since 1971, had become the equivalent of only 2.7 cents per pack.
! Georgia’s tobacco tax revenues (a sum of the cigarette and cigar tax
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revenues) had declined by 2.8 percent between FY 1999 and 2002, but had
risen modestly by 1.8 percent between FY 2001 and 2002.
! Based on two different approaches to revenue estimation,  the first year
increase in tax revenues from the 25 cent cigarette tax increase was
calculated to range between $149.01 million to $163.91 million.  This
range is consistent with the claims made by tax increase proponents, but
falls short of the highest estimates of $180 million per year.
! Furthermore, it was estimated that a 46 cent cigarette tax hike, to 58 cents
per pack (Governor Perdue’s original proposal) would have generated
between $234.51 and $287.56 million in additional first fiscal year tax
revenues.  This is somewhat lower than the frequently claimed $300
million in additional revenues linked to that higher tax rate.
! It was confirmed that there would be some offsetting loss of sales tax
revenues, although such projected losses are relatively modest: $3.848
million stemming from the 25 cent tax increase, and $7.075 million had the
tax increase been 46 cents.  These losses are linked to a decline in annual
cigarette packs consumed of 36.44 million following the 25 cent increase,
and a decline of 66.98 million packs had the tax increase been 46 cents. 
Such losses stem from the fact that Georgia is relatively unique in not
applying its state sales tax (4.0 percent) to that portion of the retail
cigarette price represented by its state cigarette excise tax. 
! A careful analysis of the magnitude of cross-border bootlegging concluded
that concerns about significant losses of Georgia Lottery revenues as
Georgians shopped for cigarettes (and other goods) in border states with
lower tobacco taxes are unwarranted.  It was estimated that less than $1.5
million in Georgia Lottery revenues was likely to be lost as a result of such
cross-border shopping, far less than even 1.0 percent of the total.
! There is no denying that tobacco excise taxes (as with all excise or sales
taxes) tend to be regressive, but academic studies have shown that this
effect is partially mitigated by evidence that lower income smokers reduce
smoking more than high income smokers as a result of tax-induced
cigarette price increases, which also suggests that the health benefits of
such tax increases are realized disproportionately by lower income
smokers.  Nevertheless, the smoking demographics within Georgia reveal
that the incidence of the higher tobacco taxes will fall disproportionately
on (1) young adults aged 18-24, especially white males; (2) Hispanics,
especially males; and (3) those with less than a high school education,
controlling for income.  However, since younger smokers do have higher
price elasticities  of  demand  for  smoking,  they  are  projected to exhibit
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larger relative reductions in consumption of tobacco products, which will
at least modestly reduce their tax burden.  
! While no independent effort was made to verify all of the health claims
made by tax increase proponents, this study does confirm that a sizeable
portion of the drop in projected cigarette sales following the 25 cent tax
hike (i.e., 36.44 million packs in the first year) is likely to result from
genuine declines in smoking (21.2 million packs) as opposed to mere
cross-border shopping in lower tax states (15.24 million packs).  This
proportionate effect of smoking reductions versus bootlegging or
smuggling of cigarettes (58.2 percent) is close to that derived from other
studies, and the actual estimated drop in the number of packs smoked is
similar to that claimed by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2002),
which would tend to confirm at least the primary premise of all of the
health benefits assertions: that higher taxes will not just lead to a diversion
of cigarette buying from other states, but will actually reduce smoking.
! Finally, this study also confirms that there is no threat of meaningful job
loss in either the tobacco growing or cigarette manufacturing sectors in
Georgia as the unique result of either the 25 cent cigarette tax increase (or
for that matter a higher 46 cent tax increase).  By contrast, it is highly
likely that some jobs will be lost in the tobacco retail distribution sector
(primarily convenience stores located near the border of lower tax states).
However, even if one accepts the projected loss of 635 such jobs
(including wholesaler jobs) generated by the American Economics Group,
such a loss would represent no more than 0.09 percent of retail
employment in Georgia.55  Longer term net job losses will inevitably be
lower as the diversion of spending away from cigarettes and other tobacco
products generates additional economic activity in other sectors of the
Georgia economy.
In summary, this study has largely confirmed the arguments made by proponents
of higher tobacco taxes as applied to Georgia.  However, it must be said that no state
should consider higher tobacco taxes to be a magic solution to fundamental structural
fiscal problems.  To the extent that such taxes further contribute to the decline in
cigarette and tobacco consumption that is the result of other factors, the long term
revenue potential of tobacco taxation is limited.  While expenditure requirements of the
state grow over time, it is common for tobacco tax revenues to remain stable or decline
over time.  Also, the projections derived herein for Georgia were supportive of the case
for higher taxes in part because even after the 25 cent increase in cigarette taxes, Georgia
remains one of the states with relatively modest tobacco taxes, and is not a state
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surrounded by states having dramatically lower taxes, nor are the border populations that
are most likely to engage in small-scale cigarette bootlegging especially large.   The
supplemental projections made in this study did indeed confirm that further revenue and
health benefits could be obtained by a subsequent tax increase of, say, 21 cents to a total
tax of 58 cents (consistent with the governor’s original 46 tax increase proposal), this
should not be interpreted as justifying a longer term strategy of regular tax tobacco
increases as a solution to Georgia’s fiscal challenges.
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NOTES:
1. Tobacco taxation in Georgia started in 1923 and following gradual increases
reached 5 cents per cigarette pack by 1955.  It was raised to 8 cents in 1964 and
then to 12 cents in 1971.  Thus, the thirty-two year gap between tax increases
was the longest since 1923; the 1971 tax rate had effectively fallen to an inflation
adjusted rate not seen since the early 1950s.  
2. The governor originally proposed raising the cigarette tax by 46 cents per pack,
along with higher taxes on alcoholic drinks (ranging from 14 cents for a six-pack
of beer to 50 cents for a bottle of liquor), as well as higher taxes on other tobacco
products.
3. See, e.g., Atlanta Journal Constitution (2003c, p. F4).  Key Republicans were
more comfortable proposing spending cuts and layoffs of state employees to
balance the budget, and most Democrats were hesitant to champion even
selective tax increases without assurances of Republican support.  
4. See e.g., National Association of Convenience Stores (2003).
5. Several opinion columns represented exceptions, although it is unclear that they
affected the political debate.  See e.g., Sue Blevins (2003); and Atlanta Journal
Constitution (2003e).  While Daniel Michael Clifton of Americans for Tax
Reform addressed the Georgia Senate Republican Caucus (Clifton, 2003)
opposing higher cigarette taxes by challenging some of the presumptions
identified below, his organization’s basic position was to oppose all tax increases
of whatever type.
6.  A commonly cited revenue projection for the 25 cent cigarette tax increase was
$180 million per year.  See, e.g., Atlanta Journal Constitution (2003b).
However, internal Office of Planning and Budget projections were more
modestly in a range of $145 to $170 million.  The original higher proposed
combined tobacco taxes were projected to raise $348 million in the first fiscal
year (Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2003d), although one tax expert cited the
revenue gains from only the cigarette tax component as $91.5 million
(Stathopoulos, 2003).  The Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (2002) claimed that
a 75 cent tax increase would generate $472.2 million in annual revenues.
7. This is a Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimate, as further documented by
the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids (2003a).
8. Governor Perdue’s extensive speaking tour around the state in support of his
original tax proposals typically generated large and supportive crowds, and
public opinion polls consistently showed strong support for higher tobacco taxes
(typically over 70 percent), especially if contrasted to other proposals for higher
gas or property taxes.  Of course, this is hardly surprising given the Georgia
adult smoking rate of 23.5 percent (see Table 2). By mid-March, all such
alternative taxes including the liquor taxes had been scrapped by the governor.
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9. In May 2003, RTI International released a study (Farrelly et al, 2003) prepared
for the Tobacco Technical Assistance Consortium at Emory University’s Rollins
School of Public Health that addresses some of these issues without focusing
specifically on the recent Georgia tax changes.  Farrelly et al. (2003) provide an
especially useful survey of the evidence regarding the effects of cigarette tax
evasion on state revenues and draws nine key conclusions, among them “states
that significantly increase their tobacco tax rates gain tobacco tax revenue,
despite related consumption declines, tax avoidance, and smuggling” (p. ES-1).
10. While Georgia tax revenues were down another 5.6 percent in June 2003,
yielding an overall decline in tax collections of $340 million (2.6 percent) over
the past year (Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2003a), August began a three
consecutive month surge in revenues compared to the previous year, with
October’s overall growth of nearly 6.0 percent (8.2 percent in sales tax revenues)
offering some optimism that at least the worst of the budget crisis was nearing
an end (Atlanta Business Chronicle, 2003).
11. Given the high correlation between income and education, it is hard to determine
whether these factors have separate effects on smoking rates.
12. The CPI (consumer price index) for the United States was 40.5 in 1971
compared to 179.9 by the end of 2002 (4.44 times the earlier level).  The average
annual inflation rate over that period was 4.93 percent, although annual inflation
has slowed to about 2 percent in recent years.  While the change in the regional
CPI measures vary slightly compared to that of the United States as a whole,
such differences are relatively small regarding Georgia (e.g. the Atlanta metro
CPI was 98.9 percent of the U.S. metro average in 1998, a typical relationship
over time).  See, e.g. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002 or the
Economic Report of the President, both published annually for updates on the
Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI measures.
13. Kentucky is first with 29 percent of tobacco receipts, followed by the “coastal
plain”(Eastern North Carolina) at 24 percent, the “Piedmont”(the Virginia, North
Carolina border area) at 24 percent, the “Pee Dee Lumber River” area of
Southeast North Carolina and eastern South Carolina at 12 percent, Tennessee
with 9 percent and “other areas” summing to 4 percent. See Economic Research
Services (1997), pp. 37-39.
14. See Statistical Abstract of the United States (2001),  reporting data from the U.S.
National Center for Health Statistics (2000).
15.  As is true with other tobacco related statistics, differences in reported revenue
exist across sources.  For example, the fiscal year 2001 revenues reported in
Table 4 are $83.334 million compared to the $83.450 million reported on the
R.J. Reynolds webpage (seemingly linked solely to cigarettes and not cigars)
documenting state-by-state tobacco statistics.  While that disparity is trivial, the
CDC reported cigarette tax revenues collected in 2000 as $67.064 million.  The
Georgia Department of Revenue regularly reports revenues from the combined
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category “cigar and cigarette tax.”  As reported in Table 4, such revenues for
both fiscal years 2000 and 2001 were in the mid $85 million range.  But it is
extremely unlikely that the 21 percent disparity between the lower CDC cigarette
revenue estimate and this combined figure is explained by cigar tax revenues,
since past studies by The Tobacco Institute (The Tax Burden on Tobacco) have
concluded that cigarette excise taxes commonly account for as much as 96
percent of all state tobacco excise tax revenues.  Thus, the reason for the
unusually low CDC cigarette revenue estimate is unclear.
16. Since calendar year 2000 includes part of fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the
revenue was averaged over those two fiscal years.  Cigarette revenues are
estimated at 96 percent of the total, consistent with The Tobacco Institute finding
cited in endnote 15.
17. As documented in Table 1, Georgia continues to rank as a low tax state (36th
highest of 51, including the District of Columbia) even following the 2003 tax
hike. But as discussed further below, it now ranks relatively high among its
neighboring states.
18. Anti-smoking groups were especially vexed by the simultaneous cuts in Illinois’
smoking cessation program budget from $47 million in 2001 to $12 million in
2002 at the very time that smokers would seemingly be more motivated to seek
such assistance in an effort to quit. Kathy Drea, the director of public policy for
the American Lung Association of Illinois said, “Illinois has really screwed this
up” (Drea, 2003).
19. The Holland Sentinel (2003) reported that forecasters had predicted a drop of
about 9.5 percent in monthly cigarette sales compared to the actual 8.5 percent
decline.  This is an intriguing example because Michigan’s previous 50 cent tax
increase in 1994 is commonly cited by tobacco tax opponents as a primary
example of the effects of bootlegging, comparing the 21 percent drop in
Michigan taxable sales with increases in neighboring states such as Indiana’s 8.5
percent increase following a several year decline (National Association of
Convenience Stores, 2002).  The 1994 tax differential between Michigan and
Indiana was 59.5 cents (75 versus 15.5); by 2002 it was 69.5 cents, although
Indiana had also raised its tax in 2002 by 40 cents to 55.5 cents.
20. The price elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of quantity
consumed to price changes, and is calculated as the ratio of the percentage
change in quantity to the percentage change in price.
21. The period from 1997 to 2000 was also characterized by unusually large
wholesale cigarette price increases as manufacturers coped with the financial
demands of the Master Settlement Agreement.  Thus, cigarette retail prices were
rising substantially for both tax and non-tax reasons during this period.
22. Note that this concept (alternatively called the “tax elasticity of revenue”) is
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quite different from the price elasticity of the demand for cigarettes, which is a
critical concept in the alternative approach used below to estimate the revenue
effects of this and future Georgia tax increases.
23. Farrelly et al. (2003) show that the average tax differences between states was
quite stable from 1980 to about 1990, then started to increase gradually until
about 2000, before spiking upward dramatically between 2000 and 2002 (Figure
2, p. 5).  Even with this recent increase in tax differences, the retail prices per
pack listed in Table 2 including 2002 tax rates do not differ as much as might be
expected.  The lowest price in South Carolina ($3.15) is 18 percent below the
national average of $3.85, while the second highest price of $4.98 (Washington)
is 29 percent higher than the average.  New York at $5.80 per pack is the outlier
at 51 percent above average.  
24. While this simple calculation assumes that the 175 percent increase can be
applied to the entire cigarette plus cigar state revenue, any error is likely to be
minor since not only do cigarette revenues constitute most of these combined
revenues, but the Georgia cigar excise tax itself more than doubled (from 10 to
23 percent) at the same time the cigarette tax rate was increased.
25. Licari and Meier (1997), Coats (1995), Saba et al. (1995), the Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (1977) are cited by Guhl as
especially important for his own model.  Many studies include some attempt to
address smuggling or “spillover” effects; see Brown (1995); Benjamin and
Dougan (1997), Merriman (1994); Thursby and Thursby (1994); Chiles and
Sollars (1993); and Warner (1982). 
26. The price of $2.76 equals the latest tax inclusive price of $3.01(Table 2) less the
25 cent tax.  While the economic theory of excise tax incidence does not
generally suggest that every one cent tax increase results in a one cent price
increase, we assume that it does in this case.  There is reasonable evidence that
this simple “pass-through” is in fact common in the case of cigarettes (Barnett
et al., 1995; Keeler et al., 1994; and Coats, 1995).  Furthermore, Sumner’s
(1981) finding of a sufficiently high price elasticity of demand for any one
cigarette manufacturer (i.e. -20.0) can be interpreted as implying a nearly
horizontal supply curve of cigarettes to any state such that any state’s excise tax
will be fully shifted to consumers.  The 25 cent tax increase thus translates into
a 25 cent higher price (no adjustment for sales taxes is required).
27. An earlier version of the data reported in Table 2 cited $3.31 as the average price
for Georgia, even before the 25 cent tax increase.  That price and all other state
prices, however, did “not reflect the temporary 65 cent reduction in Marlboro
and three other brands initiated in January 2003 by Philip Morris, nor do they
fully reflect retail-based discounting and promotions by the major cigarette
companies” (from the notes to the original data source).  The updated data
reported in Table 2 still do not reflect the retail-based discounting and other
promotions, but were changed to reflect the temporary 65 cent wholesale price
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reduction.  However, the Macon Telegraph (2003) reported that “the average
price for a pack of cigarettes in Georgia is now $3.27.”  While the tax only went
into effect on July 1, if this price already incorporated the 25 cent tax increase,
it would be $0.26 higher than that reported in Table 2.  Clearly, documenting
average retail cigarette prices is subject to potential reporting error.
28. Using the pre-tax increase price of 276 cents, consumption of 86.68 packs per
capita, and the slope of -1.78 yields a price elasticity of -0.566 (= -0.1778 x (276
/ 86.68)). 
29. An elasticity of -0.566 implies a percentage reduction in packs consumed due to
a tax increase of 25 cents of 5.13 percent (-0.566 x 9.06 percent increase in
price), and a reduction in consumption of 4.45 packs per person, from 86.68 to
82.23 per year.  The new total predicted consumption of cigarette packs is
673.135 million (= 8.186 million people x 82.23 packs per person).  At a total
tax per pack of 37 cents, this would generate $249.06 million in the first year
(673.135 million x 37 cents).
30. Since there is only about a 4 percent difference between the highest and lowest
of these values, and the -0.566 elasticity was specifically derived for Georgia as
an extension of the Guhl analysis of West Virginia (rather than just assumed
based on past econometric studies), this -0.566 case is cited in Table 6.
31. A price increase of an additional 21 cents on a base of 301 cents is a 6.98 percent
price increase.  When multiplied by the -0.651 price elasticity, a 4.54 percent
decline in per capita cigarette consumption is generated, or 3.73 packs to 78.5
packs per capita, or a total number of packs of 642.6 million.  With a per pack
tax of 58 cents, this generates $372.71 million in revenue, which is $123.65
million above the $249.06 million projected from the 25 cent tax increase.
32. Georgia counties may add local option sales taxes of from 1 to 3 percent to this
4 percent state tax rate.  Since the focus of this analysis is on the state, such
county revenue effects are not considered, but since counties do not directly
receive any of the cigarette tax revenue, the loss of local option sales tax revenue
represents a net loss to those jurisdictions.
33. This is based on 709.58 million packs (the base packs as of FY 2003 in Table 6),
or on $1.8733 billion in total sales.
34. This yields taxable sales revenue (in 2003 dollars) of $1.6965 billion and
cigarette sales tax receipts of $67.860 million.
35. Table 3 and Chart 1 (and related statistics) indicate that smokers in Georgia are
more likely to be male, 18-24 years old, white or Hispanic, with no more than
a  high  school  education,  and earning modest incomes.  Thus, a fuller database
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would report such demographics for each county as a proxy for detailed specific
county smoking rates.
36. Smoking is estimated to cause 90 percent of all such lung cancers.  A potential
alternative measure is death rates from cardiovascular disease (CVD), since
smoking is also a major risk factor for CVD.  However, since physical inactivity,
being overweight and high blood pressure are also major risk factors for CVD,
its connection to smoking is not as strong as that of lung cancer.  Lung cancer
death rates and related information are reported by the Georgia Department of
Human Resources (2003).
37. The standard methodology used in Table 7 utilized the per capita packs
consumed, based on the entire state population, to derive total state consumption
both before and after the tax increase.  However, when analyzing issues like
bootlegging and the health benefits from legitimate cigarette consumption
reductions, the more meaningful figure is per capita smoking by smokers.  Since
approximately 73.5 percent of the Georgia population is 18 years and older,
about 6.017 million residents are defined as adults.  Applying the 23.5 percent
adult smoking rate to the adult population yields 1.414 million adult smokers.
Census data also indicates that Georgians aged 5-17 constitute about 19 percent
of the population, or 1.555 million youths.  Applying the youth smoking rate of
23.7 percent to that population yields 368,535 youth smokers.  Thus, adult plus
youth smokers total 1.783 million Georgians.  Since the base number of packs
sold (Table 6) is 709.58 million, a rough estimate of the annual packs per smoker
is 398, or about 7.65 packs per week, or about one pack per day.  Note that this
somewhat overstates the amount of cigarette smoking per smoker because, to
simplify the calculations, the cigar portion of the combined tobacco tax revenues
was attributed to cigarettes in deriving the base annual figure of 709.58 million
packs of cigarettes sold.
38. Various news reports (e.g. America Online, 2003) have identified the breakup
by Federal agents of smuggling rings that made as much as $20 million shipping
cigarettes from Virginia to New York, and another ring that trucked cigarettes
from North Carolina to Michigan.  The tobacco industry has stressed the role of
the mob and organized crime in their advertising opposing higher state cigarette
taxes, while anti-smoking groups counter by accusing the industry of purposely
oversupplying wholesalers in low tax states to encourage such activity.  The
Libertarian Party warned that a $1.10 federal cigarette excise tax increase
proposed in 1998 could “launch the second Golden Age of organized crime” and
“trigger a deadly crime wave” (Libertarian Party Press, 04/02/98).
39. A related and increasing organized crime activity is the counterfeiting of
cigarette tax stamps.  As reported by Corrigan (2003), apparently “Chinese
counterfeiters can accurately duplicate not only a state’s stamps, but also the
cigarettes and packaging as well,” with very little risk of detection, as evidenced
by the absence of reported interceptions of counterfeit shipments (p. 461). Indian
“smoke shops” (physical locations, not the internet sites often run by Indian
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tribes) have also presented special challenges to states, which have sometimes
responded by signing “compact statutes” with the tribes to essentially allow them
to not only collect, but keep the tax revenue if they agree to traffic only in
“legitimate” cigarettes (Corrigan, 2003, p. 461).
40. See Don Mathews (2003), citing projections by U.S. Forrester Research, Inc., a
private consulting firm. 
41. An important statistic also cited in that press report is that as many as 60 percent
or more of smokers buy their cigarettes one to two packs at a time, rather than
in cartons (quoting Eric Lindblom (2003), policy research manager for the
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids).  While that particular source is certainly not
neutral in the tobacco tax debate, the statistic cited is hardly implausible.
42. This suggestion is made in a footnote to the Center’s commentary related to its
documentation of recent state experience with tax hikes.  See the Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids’ (2003b).
43. Lav (2002) in particular warns about subsequent year revenue declines.
44. Lindblom (2003) cites numerous research studies. Citing these specific claims
in no way belittles the similar assertions effectively presented by the many other
anti-smoking groups including the American Lung Association of Georgia, the
American Cancer Society, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and
many other organizations cited throughout this report.
45. The benefits were originally based on a 75 cent increase; we report a
proportionately adjusted benefit to reflect the actual 25 cent tax hike.
46. Admittedly, the Coats (1995) conclusion that as much as 80 percent of the
typical drop in state cigarette sales can be traced to cross-border shopping would
imply that of the 36.44 million predicted drop in Georgia cigarette sales (Table
6), fully 29.15 million would be due to cross-border effects and only 7.29 million
due to smoking reductions.  If that were applied to the Georgia case, the
Campaign’s predictions regarding the health benefits to the state could be as low
as about a third of those identified above (i.e. 7.29 / 21.2 = 0.34).  However,
nothing in the Table 7 analysis of bootlegging or the general consensus of the
magnitudes of cross-border sales from other studies would suggest that the Coats
result is applicable to the 2003 Georgia tax hike.
47. Lav (2002) provides an excellent overview of this issue.
48. Note that each of these price elasticities is below the -0.566 and -0.651 values
used to derive the revenue projections in Table 6.  One interpretation would be
that the higher Table 6 elasticities have thus already fully adjusted for the effects
of tax evasion behavior which make “unrestricted” elasticities larger than
“naive” elasticities, as discussed above.  An extreme version of a lower “smoker
elasticity” would be the essentially zero elasticity value derived by Wasserman
et al. (1991) based on individual smoker behavior.  An even more conservative
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adjustment to the Table 6 revenue projections, using a possible -0.98 price
elasticity to further adjust for the tax evasion problem, was also reported above.
49. From the National Association of Convenience Stores (2003). There is no
independent confirmation of this 40 percent figure for convenience store tobacco
sales; tax proponents have cited a figure closer to 25 percent.
50. This analysis and predictions of the adverse consequences of higher Georgia
cigarette taxes was submitted to the author in mid-December 2002 in response
to a request for the company’s position at a time when much higher tax increases
were being discussed than eventually were enacted.  For an overview of the role
of tobacco in the Georgia economy, see UGA Tobacco (2003).
51. Economic Research Services (2000).  The figures cited were for 2000 as
reported in Table 986 of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001.
52. This 666 million pack base of cigarette sales is about 6 percent lower than the
base utilized in the revenue projections derived and reported in Table 6.  This
difference may reflect the combining of cigar and cigarette sales into an
“equivalent” cigarette base figure for the Table 6 analysis, and hence will
naturally overstate the cigarette sales somewhat.  In any case, the B & W figure
is linked to a claimed $2.2 billion gross retail value, which would imply that the
average retail price was $3.30 pre-tax increase, substantially higher than the
$2.76 price (linked to the data in Table 2) that served as an important assumption
behind the analysis reported in Table 6.  However, since the important number
of base cigarette packs sold used in the analysis was derived by dividing the base
revenue of $85.15 million by the initial 12 cents per pack (yielding 709.58
million packs), without using the initial price, this price disparity does not
significantly affect the analysis in this report.
53. The use of a retail price of $3.16 is inconsistent with the derivation of an average
pre-tax retail price of about $3.30, which was itself based on the B&W figures
for pre-tax increase retail packs sold relative to retail value generated (see
endnote 52).
54. In particular, B&W cites the 1996 Tax Foundation study and a subsequent
updated study to suggest that “cross-border sales represented nearly 14 percent
of total U.S. sales in 1997" (B&W, 2003, p. 2).  If that 14 percent figure were
applied to total Georgia sales prior to the tax increase, it could be interpreted (as
a simplification) as suggesting that as many as 99.26 million cigarette packs
could be subject to cross-border sales in Georgia, dramatically higher than the
roughly 15.24 million packs predicted above to be purchased from outside
Georgia following the 25 cent tax increase.  Of course, that Tax Foundation
result was especially affected by comparisons between the highest tax states and
the lowest tax states, with limited direct applicability to Georgia under any
reasonable assumption about future Georgia cigarette tax increases.
55. As of November 2002; retail employment was 686,767 (Georgia Economic
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Indicators, 2003).
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Appendix A
A Detailed Description of the West Virginia Study
An excellent recent example of the price elasticity approach to tobacco tax
revenue estimation is provided in Guhl (2003), who examines the 38 cent per pack West
Virginia tax increase (from 17 to 55 cents) that became effective May 1, 2003.  Despite
Georgia having about 4.5 times the population of West Virginia, this attempt to develop
a model to predict the likely effects of the West Virginia increase is especially apt for
Georgia for two reasons:
1. West Virginia had also gone many years (25) without any cigarette tax
increase (versus 32 in Georgia), and its 223.5 percent increase is roughly
comparable to Georgia’s 208 percent change, although the resulting tax of
55 cents per pack is almost 50 percent higher than Georgia’s 37 cents;
2. Two of West Virginia’s neighboring states (Virginia and Kentucky) and
one near neighbor (North Carolina) have the three lowest tax rates in the
country at 2.5, 3 and 5 cents, respectively (although Virginia allows
municipalities to also levy the tax, some as high as 60 cents; Table 1),
causing concerns that West Virginia will further encourage “outside
bootlegging” to those states.  By contrast, starting about 1990 but
dramatically increasing in 2002 due to tax increases, higher cigarette
prices in Ohio, Maryland, and Pennsylvania had created enhanced
incentives for “inside bootlegging” (Guhl 2003, Figure 1, p.816).   Thus,
concern existed that West Virginia would lose cigarette revenues from
both forms of bootlegging following the tax hike.  In Georgia, the tax
increase gave it the highest cigarette tax among all its neighbors, with the
largest differential being the 30 cents relative to South Carolina (the
smallest is 3.1 cents compared to Florida), the focal point of the opposition
by Georgia convenience store interests.
Building on previous cigarette demand models, especially those focusing special
attention on both organized smuggling and more informal bootlegging,1 Guhl uses 30
years of time series data (1970-2000) to estimate a demand function for in-state
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the inclusion of both variables, and the effects of both forms of bootlegging can be
independently isolated.
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cigarettes, with the dependent variable defined as “annual per capita packs of cigarettes
sold in West Virginia.”  His key independent variables (and their expected effects) are
the real cigarette price per pack in West Virginia (negative), real annual per capita
income in the state (positive), the percentage of the state population older than 65
(negative), a time trend variable (negative), an “into the state bootlegging” variable
constructed to incorporate both higher bordering state relative cigarette prices and
bordering county populations relative to West Virginia (positive), a proxy for tourist
cigarette purchases (positive), an “outside the state bootlegging” variable constructed
similarly to the “inboot” variable but reflecting higher relative West Virginia prices
(negative),2 and an “organized smuggling” variable constructed as an index of the
relative cigarette tax rate in West Virginia relative to tax rates in Kentucky, Virginia and
North Carolina (negative).
Two of Guhl’s econometric results are particularly important: (1) the
interpretation of his price variable coefficient (-0.1778) suggests that an increase in the
real price per pack by 10 cents reduces the taxable quantity of cigarette packs by 1.78
per capita, a result that can be used to derive price elasticities of demand that increase
with prices (see below), and (2) neither of his bootlegging variables is found to be
statistically significant, suggesting that “the amount of bootlegged cigarettes does not
significantly change the match between in-state cigarette sales and West Virginia
consumption” (p. 819).  His similar finding that organized smuggling has also not been
a substantial determinant of in-state cigarette sales, despite the frequently high tax
differentials relative to tobacco state neighbors is also suggestive, but as he indicates,
must  be  interpreted  cautiously  due  to West Virginia’s relatively small population (1.8
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federal and state excise tax included in the retail price.  The price as of 2000 of $2.805
is modestly lower than the implied pre-tax increase price of $2.99  reported in Table 2
(i.e. tax inclusive price of $3.37, which includes the 38 cents, suggests a pre-tax increase
price of about $2.99 assuming full forward shifting of the tax).  Note that in Georgia, the
general state sales tax of 4 percent is not added to that portion of the retail price that
represents the state excise tax (see the notes to Table 1). 
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million) and lack of large metropolitan areas.  This result, thus, is potentially not
representative of other types of states, including Georgia.
The importance of the -0.1778 coefficient on the price variable is its implication
for the critical price elasticity of demand.  A price elasticity is defined as the (percent
change in quantity / percent change in price), which is the equivalent of [(change in
quantity / change in price) x (price/quantity)].  The price coefficient -0.1778 is the
equivalent of (change in quantity / change in price) which must be multiplied by a
particular price/quantity ratio to generate the price elasticity of demand.  While it is often
assumed that over small ranges of price changes a price elasticity of demand can be
constant, this alternative formulation is consistent with the more general understanding
that demand becomes more price elastic at higher prices.  This is a useful cautionary
result for studies of the revenue effects of higher cigarette taxes, since it implies that ever
increasing taxes can have quite different effects as prices increase, although such effects
would further enhance the smoking deterrence and health benefit effects of cigarette
taxation.
As applied to the West Virginia data, where the real price (in 2002 dollars) as of
2000 was $2.805 (280.5 cents)3 and the 2000 annual per capita consumption was 107.9
packs, the resulting price elasticity of demand as of 2000 was -0.46 (i.e. -0.1778 x (280.5
/ 107.9)).   The next step is to calculate the effect of the tax increase on the retail price
of cigarettes.  While the general theory of excise tax incidence does not suggest that
every one cent tax increase generates a one cent price increase, there is reasonable
evidence that this simple “pass-through” is common in the case of cigarettes (Barnett et
al., 1995; Keeler et al., 1994; and Coats, 1995).  Furthermore, Sumner’s (1981) finding
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of a sufficiently high price elasticity of demand for any one cigarette manufacturer (i.e.
-20.0) can be interpreted as implying a nearly horizontal supply curve of cigarettes to any
state such that any state’s excise tax will be fully shifted to consumers.   For most states
(but not Georgia, see the notes to Table 1), a further retail price increase will occur
because any applicable sales tax is applied to the excise tax portion of the retail price.
Thus, in West Virginia the 38 cent tax increase is presumed to generate a 40.1
cent retail price increase (including the 6 percent x 38 = 2.28 cent change).  Since a 40.1
cent price increase represents a 14.295 percent change, the resulting  reduction in the
quantity of per capita cigarette packs consumed is 6.576 percent (- 0.46 x 14.295).  West
Virginia consumption would thus be predicted to fall from 107.9 packs per capita to
100.8 (a reduction of 7.09 representing 6.576 percent of 107.9).   The final step is then
to translate this reduction into revenue terms.  With a population of 1.808 million, the
original 107.9 packs per capita translates into 195.083 million packs taxed at 17 cents
yielding $33.164 million state revenue.  Following the tax increase, the 1.808 million
population generates 182.246 million packs consumed, taxed at 55 cents to yield
$100.235 million-an increase of 202.2 percent.    
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Appendix B
A Survey of the Literature Regarding Tobacco Tax Evasion
A summary of a representative sample of the critical research (organized
chronologically and focused where possible on results involving Georgia) on the various
forms of tax evasion provides potentially important additional evidence on this important
issue.  
1. Mikesell (1970) focused on cities rather than states and general sales tax
differentials rather than cigarette tax differentials.  Nevertheless, he
provided evidence that a positive sales tax rate differential exerts a
significant negative effect on per capita city retail sales, deriving the result
of a 95 percent probability that a 1 percent increase in the sales tax rate
would generate a loss in per capita city sales of between 1.69 and 10.97
percent.  Of course, this applied to general sales taxes, not just the tax on
a single product like cigarettes, and proximity to competing tax
jurisdictions is especially high at the city level.   This early research set the
stage for later results that stressed the role of geographic proximity and the
nature and scope of the tax differential, i.e. general sales versus selective
excise taxes;  
2. The potential for cross-border relocations of economic activity as a result
of tax variations has always been great in Tennessee, which borders eight
states.  Hence the Fox (1986) study of three Tennessee metro areas
bordering three different states (including Georgia via Chattanooga) is
especially noteworthy.  His key findings are: (1) there is “only limited
evidence that taxes other than the general sales tax have an effect on total
retail activity;” (2) “the effect of selective sales taxes was small ... or zero
on overall retail activity;” (3) “selective sales taxes on cigarettes and
alcohol may have a greater effect on retail activity in more defined groups
than were addressed in this study” [total sales, furniture, food at home,
apparel, food away from home]; (4) “lost employment induced by a tax
rate increase is generally of about the same magnitude as the lost sales;”
and (5) the employment losses from changes in taxes other than the
general sales tax are very small” (all quotations are from p. 399).  While
there were significant tax differentials regarding some of the taxes and
regions in the Fox study, it is not surprising that “no fiscal variables were
significant in the Chattanooga area,” since tax differentials were the
smallest in that region.  The specific cigarette tax differential between
Georgia and Tennessee over the 1962-1985 period of the data never
exceeded one cent.  Thus, while the conclusions of only mild cross-border
effects beyond general sales taxes are important, and his estimates of
employment losses relative to revenue losses are especially useful, the
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study provided no relevant specific evidence on cigarette tax evasion
related to Georgia;
3. Another study with Georgia included in the database is Chiles and Sollars
(1993), which found that over the period 1955 to 1990 the demand for
cigarettes in Alabama was relatively price inelastic, with only small
“spillover” effects between Alabama and bordering states.  During that
period, Alabama’s average nominal cigarette retail price differential with
Georgia was 3.6 cents, ranging from a low of 1.2 cents in 1960 to a high
of 6.8 cents in 1990.  The biggest price differentials were with Florida,
where retail prices were as much as 11 cents higher than in Alabama
(about an 8 percent difference).  While they concluded that cigarette taxes
were still a source of new revenues, the revenue complications were
indeed greater as price differentials grew, and they warned that cigarette
tax revenues as a long run fiscal strategy are questionable in the face of
stagnant and declining sales;
4. Baltagi and Levin (1986) estimated a dynamic demand model for
cigarettes based on panel data for 46 states (including Georgia) from 1963
to 1988.  While a key focus of their research is to clarify some of the
biases in cross-sectional versus time series analysis of cigarette demand,
their most important findings for tax policy are that there is: (1) a small but
statistically significant “border purchasing” effect; (2) an inelastic price
elasticity;  (3) a small income effect; and (4) a significant “habit
persistence” effect, confirming the usual expectations about the difficulties
of changing smoking behavior; 
5. An especially interesting study of cigarette smuggling was conducted by
Saba et al. (1995), concluding that “border crossing is a significant
determinant of cigarettes sales in at least some states,” but that the “extent
of border-crossing activity is typically small (less than 1 percent of total
sales).”  This particular finding is nearly identical to a similar study of
cross-border sales of alcohol by some of the same authors (Beard et al.,
1997), who found usually small, but in some jurisdictions “quite
significant” effects.  The Saba et al.(1995) specific findings regarding
Georgia are of particular interest.  For 1973, Georgia had 0.56 percent of
consumers going outside the state for cheaper cigarettes, while only 0.21
percent of its cigarette sales were imported from other states.  By 1986,
imports remained fairly stable at 0.26 percent of sales, but consumers
shopping outside the state had dropped to only 0.13 percent.   Important
related results deal with the estimated price elasticities of demand for
cigarettes in Georgia.  Both a “naive” (restricting the model to zero cross-
border effects) and an “unrestricted” (allowing cross-border effects)
elasticity was estimated for both years.  In 1973 the naive price elasticity
was -0.79 compared to the unrestricted elasticity of -1.15.  But by 1986,
these two elasticities had fallen respectively to -0.69 and -0.9;
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6. Note that the price elasticity approach results in Table 6 utilized a price
elasticity of demand of -0.68 (derived from the recent West Virginia study)
in analyzing the 25 cent 2003 tax increase, and -0.77 for a possible future
increase of 21 cents.  Therefore, the projections derived in Table 6 are
reasonably consistent with the Saba et al. (1995) findings, even when
specifically adjusting for cross-border effects.  This is especially the case
given the ever declining inflation adjusted real cigarette tax and the low
Georgia cigarette prices relative to the national average.  Both of those
factors would have suggested that the decline in the price elasticities found
by Saba et al. between 1973 and 1986 would have continued to 2003.
Nevertheless, had the -0.98 price elasticity been used to project revenues
from the 25 cent tax increase, the projected revenue increase during the
first fiscal year would have been $157.97 million rather than $163.91
million, a downward adjustment of 3.6 percent.4  Since the analysis of any
subsequent 21 cent increase had already utilized a higher price elasticity
of -0.77, a similar further upward adjustment in light of the “unrestricted”
Saba et al. estimates would have generated a similarly modest downward
adjustment;
7. The study finding the greatest magnitude of cross-border cigarette sales
effects is Coats (1995), whose results rival and even exceed the 1977
ACIR study.  He attempts to integrate past estimates of the response of
state cigarette sales to state cigarette taxes, with other studies focusing
more generally on individual consumer reactions to cigarette price
changes, whatever their cause.   He claims that by measuring both
responses in the same regression, he obtains more accurate results, which
differ surprisingly from the seeming consensus of most of the studies
discussed above - that cross-border effects can be significant in selected
cases, but are generally small.  By contrast, Coats concludes that “about
four-fifths of the sales response to state cigarette taxes is due to cross-
border sales,” based on a pooled time-series and cross-section database
from 1964-1986.  Note that this result is not inconsistent with states
generating net positive revenues from higher cigarette excise taxes.  But
it does suggest that the beneficial health claims from such taxes would be
limited since little of the reduction in state cigarette sales can be linked to
reduced smoking;
8. Perhaps the Coats (1995) finding reflects a fraying in the more optimistic
consensus that can only grow in the face of increasing interstate tax
differentials.  For example, Farrelly et al. (2002 and 2003) continue to find
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small smoker bootlegging effects, although much larger tax evasion effects
via organized smuggling to supplement the increasing threat of internet
sales, but with the net effect still being large positive revenue benefits to
states that significantly increase their cigarette tax rates.  Meanwhile,
Fleenor (2003), provides a much more sober assessment.  While focused
on the clearly special case of New York, the lengthy time period means
that New York’s more recent dramatic tax increases cannot be the full
explanation for the problems identified;
9. Coats (1995, Table 1) also draws particular attention to a few other studies
in addition to those discussed in more detail above.  While these studies
generated numerous results, it is sufficient to cite only the important
cigarette price elasticity of demand findings.  Lyon and Simon (1968) used
cross-sectional and quasi-experimental data from 1954-1965 across states
to derive a price elasticity of -0.511.  Fujii (1980) used time series data
from 1929-1973 at the national level and found a price elasticity of -0.624,
an important finding since national data does not focus on variations in
state tax rates, which suggests that the consumption effects are primarily
the result of reduced smoking.  Bishop and Yoo (1985) did a similar study
but over the period 1954-1980, deriving a price elasticity of -0.454.  By
contrast, Wasserman et al. (1991) studied individual smoking decisions
using cross section data from 1970-1988, and were not able to find a
statistically significant price elasticity of demand for cigarettes different
from zero.  This latter result, if generalized, would maximize any state
revenues from higher tobacco taxes but would provide no health benefits.
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incentive program.  FRC Report/Brief 81 (January 2003)
The Economics of Cigarette Taxation:
Lessons for Georgia
78
The Bush Economic Stimulus Plan:  What Does It Mean for Georgia.  (Sally Wallace)
This brief provides a summary of the President’s economic stimulus proposal.  FRC Brief
80 (January 2003)
The Effect of State Income Tax Structure on Interstate Migration.  (Sally Wallace)
This report analyzes the effect of state income taxes on individual migration among states.
FRC Report/Brief 79 (December 2002)
Georgia’s Corporate Income and Net Worth Taxes. (Martin F. Grace)
This report examines the Georgia Corporate Income tax and Net Worth Tax and examines
some possible reforms.  FRC Report/Brief 78 (December 2002) 
Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994-2001: Trends, Causes and Impact on
Teacher Quality. (Catherine Freeman, Benjamin Scafidi and David L. Sjoquist)
This report looks at recent trends in segregation and its impact on teacher quality in the state
of Georgia.  FRC Report/Brief 77 (November 2002)
Job Creation by Georgia Start-Up Businesses.  (Lakshmi Pandey and Jeanie Thomas)
This report examines the success rate of start-up companies in Georgia by industry and by
region between 1986 and 2000. FRC Report 76 (November 2002)
Local Tax Base Sharing: An Incentive for Intergovernmental Cooperation.  (Geoffrey
Turnbull)
This report develops and explains the principles for designing effective tax base sharing
among local governments as a means of coordinating development incentives.  FRC
Report/Brief 75 (October 2002)
Firm-Level Effects of Apportionment Formula Changes.  (Kelly  D.  Edmiston  and F.
Javier Arze)
This report utilizes Georgia corporate income tax returns from 1992 - 1998 to examine the
effects of its 1995 change in apportionment formula on the levels of sales, payroll, and
property in the state.  FRC Report/Brief 74 (October 2002)
Local Land Use Policy and Investment Incentives.  (Geoffrey Turnbull)
This report discusses how the threat of land use regulation affects the pace and pattern of
urban development and how legal constraints on policymakers can alter the intended effects
of land use controls.   FRP Report 73 (June 2002)
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center at
404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737. )
